By: Fern Sidman

A recently surfaced intelligence report from Hamas’s Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, detailed in a new study by Lt. Col. (res.) Yehonatan Daḥoḥ HaLevi of the Jerusalem Center for Foreign Relations and Security, offers a stark and deeply troubling insight into how Israel’s adversaries interpreted — and ultimately exploited — the country’s political and social turmoil in the lead-up to the October 7 massacre. As VIN News reported on Thursday, Hamas’s own internal assessments reveal that by mid-2023, its leadership had concluded that “the crisis in Israel constitutes a decisive factor in impairing the IDF’s operational readiness,” setting the stage for one of the deadliest attacks in the nation’s history.

Daḥoḥ HaLevi told Arutz Sheva that the October 7 operation was not a spontaneous act of violence but the culmination of nearly a decade of planning. As early as 2014, Hamas began conceptualizing a large-scale offensive aimed at penetrating Israeli territory. The initial strategy centered on infiltration through an extensive tunnel network — a tactic Hamas invested in heavily until Israel’s construction of a state-of-the-art subterranean barrier rendered it far less viable.

Faced with this obstacle, Hamas adapted its plans toward a mass ground invasion. This reconfigured blueprint received official approval at a high-level conference in Gaza on September 30, 2021, presided over by Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. The operation’s codename, “Operation Guaranteeing the End of Days,” signaled the maximalist scope of Hamas’s ambitions: nothing less than the “conquest of Palestine” and the eradication of Jewish presence in Israel.

By early 2022, under the Bennett-Lapid government, the plan had been finalized. According to the information provided in the VIN News report, Hamas initially considered launching the operation during the Tishrei holiday season, anticipating the element of surprise and the vulnerabilities that often accompany holiday periods in Israel.

The return of a right-wing government in December 2022 presented Hamas with a paradox. On one hand, Sinwar and his deputies saw a reinvigorated Israeli security posture as a potential threat. On the other, they believed the new government’s hardline policies would diminish Israel’s international standing, creating diplomatic isolation that could be leveraged. This dual perception reinforced Hamas’s confidence that its long-term strategic goals were attainable.

By mid-2023, Hamas’s intelligence apparatus was closely monitoring Israel’s deepening domestic crisis. The organization’s analysts tracked political infighting, large-scale civil protests, and — most critically — the growing movement among IDF reservists to refuse service in protest of government policies.

On July 25, 2023, Hamas intelligence delivered a formal report to its leadership. As theVIN News report recounted from Daḥoḥ HaLevi’s research, the report concluded that “mass calls for reserve-duty refusal were undermining IDF readiness” and recommended that Sinwar delay any major action until the crisis had deepened further. The assessment reflected Hamas’s belief that Israel’s social cohesion — a critical component of its military resilience — was unraveling in real time.

Hamas propaganda channels eagerly disseminated reports of Israel’s internal discord, highlighting statements from Israeli protest leaders. One particularly provocative remark, made by anti-government figure Shikma Bressler in August 2023 — “Netanyahu, you won’t have an army by September” — was singled out in Hamas’s internal analysis as evidence of systemic breakdown.

According to Daḥoḥ HaLevi, such declarations, when amplified through Hamas-controlled media, reinforced the perception within the group’s command that Israel’s capacity to respond decisively was compromised. This assessment would prove instrumental in setting the final date for the assault.

While the original operational plan envisioned a Jewish holiday offensive, the ultimate decision on timing factored in both the IDF’s perceived weakness and an opportunity to ignite a broader regional reaction. Hamas leadership saw escalating tensions around the Temple Mount’s al-Aqsa Mosque as an ideal pretext for mobilizing Palestinian unrest in Judea, Samaria, and within Israel’s own borders.

By the summer of 2023, Hamas’s strategic goal was to ensure that the attack would resonate far beyond Gaza, drawing in Arab populations across the region and galvanizing international support under the banner of defending al-Aqsa. Sinwar’s reference to the 2021 “Shield of Jerusalem” operation as a mere “prelude” underscored his ambition to ignite a larger, multi-front confrontation.

In Daḥoḥ HaLevi’s analysis, the July–September 2023 period was pivotal. The sustained and highly publicized reserve refusals — combined with relentless domestic protests and parliamentary instability — became the decisive factor in Hamas’s decision-making process. By early autumn, the group’s leadership believed they were facing an adversary not only distracted but dangerously fractured.

The IDF’s operational readiness, in Hamas’s view, was at its lowest ebb in years. The public perception of dysfunction, especially when broadcast internationally, further emboldened the belief that Israel’s deterrence had eroded.

When asked to identify Israel’s critical misstep, Daḥoḥ HaLevi was unequivocal: “Israel’s persistent political crisis, which eroded national cohesion and military readiness, taught Hamas that the balance of power was shifting in their favor. This internal unraveling was the core failure — even as a clear existential military threat was forming right across the border.”

In other words, the most advanced border fortifications, intelligence capabilities, and counterterrorism operations cannot compensate for a perceived collapse in the societal and political will to defend the state. To Hamas, the spectacle of Israelis clashing with one another in the streets, in parliament, and even within the military itself was not simply a sign of weakness — it was an invitation.

The findings outlined by Daḥoḥ HaLevi and reported by VIN News serve as a sobering reminder that military preparedness is not solely measured in hardware, troop numbers, or tactical doctrine. It is equally dependent on the unity of purpose that underpins a nation’s will to fight.

Hamas’s exploitation of Israel’s internal discord demonstrates that adversaries pay close attention not only to military deployments but to the domestic political climate, public morale, and the narratives that emerge from within a society. In this case, the combination of public dissent, high-profile reserve refusals, and political instability provided the perfect storm for Hamas to time an attack of unprecedented scale and brutality.

The October 7 massacre was not the product of a single failure, but of a convergence of long-term strategic planning by Hamas and acute, short-term vulnerabilities within Israel. Hamas had been refining its vision of a large-scale assault for nearly a decade, adjusting its tactics in response to Israeli defenses while watching for the optimal moment to strike. That moment arrived when Israel appeared, in Hamas’s eyes, to be tearing itself apart from within.

The lesson is as clear as it is urgent: in the volatile environment of the Middle East, national unity is not a luxury — it is a strategic necessity. The cracks that appear in a society under political strain can quickly become the fault lines through which enemies mount their most devastating offensives.

If Israel is to prevent another October 7, it must reckon not only with the tactical failures of that day, but with the deeper societal fractures that made such a strike conceivable in the first place. As Daḥoḥ HaLevi’s analysis makes plain, the battleground is not just at the border — it is in the cohesion of the nation itself.