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Yaakov Katz
Back in October 2023, in the first days after Hamas’s surprise attack, it seemed almost impossible that Binyamin Netanyahu would still be Israel’s prime minister two and a half years later.
As ministers gathered for an emergency security cabinet meeting on the afternoon of October 7, one of Netanyahu’s closest political allies, finance minister Bezalel Smotrich, told him: “Within 48 hours they will ask us to resign — and they will be right to do so.”
Israel had just experienced the worst disaster in its history, the government and the IDF had failed, and Netanyahu, who had spent more than a decade shaping the country’s policy on Hamas, bore the brunt of the responsibility. He appeared politically finished.
But he wasn’t.
Today, Netanyahu is not only still in office, he is the frontrunner in polls before the next election, while his main rival, former prime minister Naftali Bennett, trails behind.
There is no single explanation for how Netanyahu has managed this remarkable political recovery. But taken together, several factors help explain how he went from the brink of political collapse to once again standing at the forefront of Israeli and, with the current war against Iran, global politics.
The first was timing and narrative. In the immediate aftermath of October 7, rather than allowing the focus to remain on accountability, Netanyahu redirected it towards the need to win the war against Hamas. Investigations of the failures that led to the attack, he argued, would come later; what mattered at this point was defeating Hamas, restoring deterrence, and bringing the hostages home.
For a large part of the public, this argument worked. Israel was still in shock, hundreds of thousands of reservists had been drafted, and entire swathes of the country had been evacuated. The national instinct was to rally around the flag and, indirectly, behind the government.
The longer the fighting went on — the Gaza war ended two years after it began — the more Netanyahu was able to delay the conversation about responsibility.
The second factor playing to his advantage is the tangible military accomplishments Israel has since achieved under his government. In Gaza, Hamas has been significantly weakened, its leadership eliminated and — with the help of the Trump administration — all of the hostages, living and dead, were returned.
In the north, Hezbollah was also severely degraded. Yes, it still poses a threat, as the renewed conflict clearly shows, but the elimination in late 2024 of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, probably the most notorious of Israel’s enemies for more than 30 years, marked a significant moment. Additional operations such as the famous pager attack, which killed other senior Hezbollah figures in 2024, demonstrated a level of intelligence penetration and operational creativity that reinforced Israel’s image of military and intelligence superiority.
Then came Iran.
The 12-day war in June 2025, followed by the current campaign, have both dramatically changed Israel’s strategic landscape. Unlike in America, where President Donald Trump faces stiff opposition to the war, in Israel there is overwhelming support for it. In addition, for the first time, Israel and the United States are operating in the most intimate of military alliances, best described as an upgraded version of what Britain was to America in the Second World War.
Politically, these operations underscore something Netanyahu has long argued: it is his relationship with the US — and particularly with Trump — that is necessary to keep Israel safe. Only he, the argument goes, knows how to cultivate that type of alliance with an American president.
Another factor in Netanyahu’s favour is the weakness of the opposition. More than two years after October 7, there is still no clear alternative to lead Israel. While Bennett enjoyed a surge in the polls, he is now struggling to maintain momentum. The other opposition parties remain divided, there are almost no fresh faces, and no single candidate who can put up a unified challenge to Netanyahu.
Netanyahu is also far from being a fresh face but, for Israelis who face ongoing security threats, the familiar is often seen as safe, especially when the alternative is unclear.
The date for the next election remains undecided. Legally, it must be held by the end of October, but there is always the possibility that Netanyahu will decide to hold it earlier. When the current war with Iran broke out, there was speculation in the political establishment that Netanyahu would call snap elections to capitalise on the military successes.
But as the war passes the five-week mark, his calculation appears to have shifted. Early expectations of a decisive and quick victory against Iran were premature. Instead, there is an understanding that the war could carry on for several more weeks. If it ends without Iran’s stockpile of uranium in American or Israeli hands, the opposition within Israel will have real ammunition to use to attack Netanyahu.
Similarly, in Lebanon, the IDF is now engaged in what looks like a prolonged ground operation. Already, 10 soldiers have been killed in the war, and if the fighting drags on without a clear outcome, public support will erode. The same uncertainty exists in Gaza, where Hamas, despite significant losses, still retains control over half the territory, while showing no signs it is prepared to disarm.
Delaying the election offers Netanyahu the opportunity to once again change the narrative. Time allows for the security situation to stabilise, for new diplomatic opportunities to emerge, and for the public’s focus to shift away from unresolved questions of the war.
What does not seem to be part of the calculation is his criminal trial over allegations of fraud and bribery. Netanyahu remains under indictment, and the trial would be continuing were it not for the war. But the national conversation has shifted, in part due to Trump’s public call that Netanyahu be pardoned. It’s unlikely that a pardon will be given before the election, but if Netanyahu wins this year, the president could decide that a pardon is justified as the people have spoken.
One area where Netanyahu will likely try to make progress is with Israel’s neighbours in the region. Despite being hit hard by Iran, Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have maintained a relatively measured tone towards Israel. At the same time, they have reportedly been pushing Trump to keep the pressure on Iran. If Netanyahu can present Israelis with a path towards normalisation of relations with Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, after the war, that would significantly boost his political standing.
The Israeli prime minister visits the city of Dimona on March 22, after an Iranian ballistic missile wounded 50 residentsAlexi J Rosenfeld/Getty Images
But all of this depends on a series of “ifs” — if the war with Iran has a clear win; if the IDF does not get bogged down in Lebanon; if Hamas does not try to launch attacks again.
And yet, despite this uncertainty, Israeli politics continues to revolve around Netanyahu. He dominates headlines, he sets the national conversation, and he will do everything he can to make the next election, whenever it is held, not about policy but about a single question: whether Israelis believe that he is still the person they trust to lead the country.
This is a remarkable position for someone who thought he had reached the end of his political career on the morning of October 7.
It does not mean that Netanyahu will win the election. The polls put his current coalition short of a majority. At the same time, though, the opposition also lacks a path to forming a government. If this remains unchanged, Israel could once again find itself in a cycle of political deadlock and repeated elections, during which Netanyahu will remain in office.
And therein lies perhaps the most important point. The story of Netanyahu is not just about a political comeback — it is about how, even after the nation’s most significant failure, there is no clear alternative to his continued rule. For Netanyahu, this is exactly what he wanted — more time and a new story to tell his voters.
Yaakov Katz is a co-founder of the MEAD policy forum, a senior fellow at JPPI, and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post. His latest book is While Israel Slept.
