Getting your Trinity Audio player ready...

(JNS) The spectacle of Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin laughing and holding hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in the Chinese city of Tianjin last week should come as no surprise.

Their interest in creating and leading a multipolar world order is just one among several reasons their alliance is taking shape. However, it is not clear whether it was indeed President Donald Trump who pushed India into Russia’s and China’s embrace, and the bigger question is how Israel fits into this diplomatic puzzle, especially since India is perhaps Israel’s second most important strategic ally.

Oshrit Birvadker, an expert on India’s foreign policy and security, a senior researcher at the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) and the CEO of Indivade consultancy firm, told JNS that Trump may be the cause “based on recent events, but the overall situation is much more complex.”

“The United States relies on India as a security partner in Asia and as a counterbalance to China,” she said, adding that while Trump’s re-election led to shifts in policy across many areas, “the strategic approach regarding the Chinese threat remains unchanged.”

However, she noted, India’s clear foreign policy of diversifying its partnerships is part of its aim “to be a significant anchor in a multipolar world.”

She explained that India “relies heavily on Chinese supply chains, and both countries share common interests regarding the Global South’s position toward developed nations, particularly the United States. For example, they have mutual interests in the World Trade Organization and climate-related issues.”

According to Birvadker, the relationship between Beijing and Delhi is complex. However, alongside the tensions, there is also mutual understanding and cooperation.

When it comes to the border dispute, there is a sense of hostility, with both also concerned about the other’s presence in their periphery—be it China in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, or India with the Philippines and Taiwan.

Birvadker said it was “crucial” to understand how India views itself on the world stage.

She explained that India sees itself as a “lighthouse projecting Indian values and culture globally,” determined not to yield to outside dictates, even from the United States.

According to her, India’s defensiveness today stems from deeper wounds: colonial trauma and Cold War-era hostility toward America, especially after Pakistan’s nuclear development and the resulting arms race.

Although decades of effort have built trust in recent years, several developments, Trump’s handling of tariffs, his claim of credit for the ceasefire following “Operation Sindoor” (New Delhi’s missile strike against Pakistan), the U.S. reception of Pakistan’s army chief, and the Nobel Peace Prize issue all revived old resentments. For many in India, these actions were perceived as an affront to national dignity and respect.

How Israel manages its relationship with the United States, Russia, China and India in this specific diplomatic arena, is crucial and will impact future decisions and developments.

According to Birvadker, “There is a very clear understanding that the relationship between India and Israel stands on its own.”

She noted that Israel “has demonstrated multiple times throughout history that it does not always align with Washington regarding India, for example, during the Cold War, when Israel supplied arms to India while the United States backed Pakistan.”

Another example she pointed to is when Israel publicly condemned American sanctions following India’s nuclear tests in the late 1990s.

“While there is a strategic partnership between the three countries, as well as a partnership rooted in shared democratic values, the relations between India and Israel are independent,” Birvadker told JNS, adding that she doesn’t believe we will see any significant change in one direction.

“This is a specific incident that requires diplomatic skill and restraint from both sides, so that both parties end up satisfied,” she said. “For now, this tension only benefits the Israeli defense industry, which competes with American companies for important contracts with the Indian military.”

As part of this diplomatic balancing act, Israel can play an important role in using its clout and further developing its relationship with each country individually.

According to Birvadker, “the close relationships between Israel and Washington have always been key for New Delhi in Washington, but today, New Delhi also knows how to act independently in Washington.”

However, she noted, “given the strategic alliance between Jerusalem and New Delhi, one that has repeatedly proven itself during times of crisis, including during the Gaza war when many countries turned their backs on Israel, if India requests assistance, there is no doubt that Israel will help.”

Irina Tsukerman, a national security and human rights lawyer, journalist and geopolitical analyst, told JNS that India’s recent shifts reflect a sharpened instinct for autonomy in response to what it sees as American hypocrisy.

To Indian ears, U.S. lectures to New Delhi “sound like a double standard that sacrifices their economic stability to make a political point,” she said.

This appears to be the case on several issues. Washington criticizes India’s Russian oil imports while European states exploit loopholes, and Indian students are treated as bargaining chips in tariff talks.

As a result, India, once drifting away from Moscow, has reopened channels of cooperation, with “a cascade of gestures that all leaned toward the Eurasian bloc,” according to Tsukerman.

She told JNS that Modi’s visible warmth with Putin, new defense discussions and even a cautious thaw with Beijing underscore a deliberate message: “India can keep talking to the West and the continental powers at the same time.”

The more Washington seems to push India away, the easier it is for Beijing to present itself as the pragmatic neighbor ready to provide solutions.

Of course, as Tsukerman pointed out, none of this erases the continued friction between India and China. The border remains militarized and distrust runs deep. But tactical détente is real when domestic economics demand growth and external partners apply pressure.

“India is not switching camps; it is changing price. The cost of alignment with Washington went up,” said Tsukerman.

Turning to Israel’s relationship with India, Tsukerman told JNS that India is central to Israel’s long-term strategy, with defense cooperation spanning air defense, missiles, surveillance and joint production systems.

However, she warned that a closer tilt toward Moscow risks Russian technicians gaining exposure to Israeli-linked systems, raising concerns about “technology seepage.” Similarly, China’s growing role in India’s economy and diplomacy threatens to bring restricted components into dual-use supply chains, complicating Israeli exports and tightening Western controls.

Connectivity projects such as the Expansion of the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC+) are also at stake. Israel’s ports and corridors were positioned as vital links between South Asia and Europe, but if India deepens trade with Russia and China, or if U.S. neglect weakens political momentum, Israel’s pivotal role risks being reduced to a concept.

“For Israel, the problem is not just India’s hedging but the fact that the hedging is incentivized by American inconsistency,” said Tsukerman.

On Friday, Trump posted on social media, “Looks like we’ve lost India and Russia to deepest, darkest China.”

However, on Saturday, Trump told reporters at the White House, “I’ll always be friends with Modi. He’s a great prime minister. But I just don’t like what he’s doing right now. But India and the United States have a very special relationship. There’s nothing to worry about. We just have moments on occasion.”

The president added he was open to resetting ties with India after weeks of tension over New Delhi’s purchases of Russian energy, which the United States said was grounds to slap 25% punitive tariffs on imports from India—bringing the total levy to 50%.

This type of inconsistency is concerning to Tsukerman. However, in her view, Israel still has options, such as trilateral ventures with Gulf partners, stricter safeguards on tech transfers, or modular IMEC+ projects. But without steadier U.S. alignment, Israel’s ability to anchor India firmly within its strategic network remains fragile.

According to Tsukerman, repairing strained relations requires practical steps and she believes Israel has the ability to cushion these shocks.

“It can expand cooperation with India in low-visibility but high-impact domains like radar materials, secure communications and space situational awareness,” she said. “These projects build trust away from the spotlight, making it harder for political turbulence to unravel them.”

She added that Israel can also “anchor trilateral ventures with Gulf partners that tie Indian infrastructure into regional stability frameworks,” and that by “modularizing these initiatives, Israel keeps the strategic glue intact even if Washington’s posture wobbles.”

For Tsukerman, realism is essential. India will keep ties with Russia, and its tentative thaw with China is tactical, not strategic. The danger lies in supply chain infiltration, requiring strict safeguards for Israeli technologies.

The ever-changing uncertainty surrounding the Russia-China-India relationship as well as their relationship with the United States is important to keep track of.

According to Tsukerman, “For Israel, that means working twice as hard to anchor India in reliable, modular and shielded cooperation frameworks that can outlast the turbulence.”