By: Fern Sidman

A Palestinian Telegram channel operated by a Hebron resident has published detailed instructions aimed at guiding so-called “lone wolf” terrorists in staging attacks across Israel, according to a report that appeared on Tuesday on Israel National News (INN). The disturbing content highlights the persistent digital radicalization efforts of terror affiliates, even as Israel continues its multifaceted campaign against Hamas and other Iranian-backed terror organizations.

The channel explicitly invokes the term “lone wolf,” describing individuals who carry out attacks without formal organizational backing but are inspired by extremist groups, including Hamas. According to the information provided in the INN report, the material disseminated is practical, tactical, and chillingly precise — an attempt to lower the barrier of entry for terrorism by instructing would-be assailants on how to blend into civilian life while preparing to strike.

The operators emphasize that those aspiring to act should maintain an “ordinary outward appearance” to avoid arousing suspicion. Recommendations include wearing the same style of clothing as typical young men, shaving beards to reduce stereotypical profiling, avoiding conspicuous or bulky bags, and mastering calm, confident body language.

The channel’s guidance goes beyond appearance, offering specific timing strategies designed to exploit structural vulnerabilities in Israeli security procedures. According to the information contained in the INN report, the operators advise that attacks are best staged in the early morning hours, during periods of heavy commuter traffic. At these times, Israeli security forces face congestion at checkpoints, limiting their ability to thoroughly inspect every Palestinian vehicle passing through.

By weaponizing daily civilian patterns and logistical constraints, the instructions attempt to transform ordinary traffic conditions into an opportunity for terrorism.

Another troubling detail, highlighted in the Israel National News report, is the encouragement to use forged identity cards. The channel asserts that superficial inspections during peak traffic hours create a window for forged documents to pass without detection, banking on the assumption that soldiers under time pressure will not scrutinize IDs too closely.

This tactic mirrors long-standing methods used by organized cells but now reframed for individual actors — a sign of how digital platforms are transferring operational knowledge once reserved for trained operatives into the hands of untrained civilians.

Perhaps most striking is the recommendation regarding travel to potential targets. The instructions insist that aspiring attackers do not need access to private cars. Instead, they are urged to reach Palestinian checkpoints by hitchhiking, and from there to continue via public transportation such as buses or trains.

As the INN report noted, this guidance demonstrates an attempt to make attacks more accessible by removing logistical hurdles, ensuring even those without financial resources or access to vehicles can still act on extremist impulses. By encouraging public transit as a means of movement, the operators also seek to camouflage attackers among the daily flow of commuters.

The emergence of this channel draws attention to the continuing threat of decentralized terrorism in Israel. While Hamas and other organizations remain the primary orchestrators of large-scale operations, Israel National News reports have repeatedly emphasized the dangers posed by individuals radicalized online who act without direct orders.

The “lone wolf” model is attractive to terrorist groups precisely because it is harder for Israeli intelligence services to preempt. Without clear communication links or hierarchical planning, attackers can emerge seemingly out of nowhere, inspired by social media channels, propaganda videos, and encrypted platforms such as Telegram.

For Israeli security forces, the publication of such instructions highlights the complexity of preventing attacks that rely less on organizational networks and more on easily available, low-tech methods. As INN has reported, Israel’s intelligence services have grown increasingly adept at dismantling terror cells and tracking financial networks, but lone actors with minimal connections present a different and diffuse challenge.

The focus on disguises, forged papers, and timing reflects a deliberate attempt to circumvent precisely the kinds of detection systems Israel has refined since the Second Intifada. It also illustrates how terrorist sympathizers attempt to adapt in real time to Israeli countermeasures.

Equally significant is the propaganda value of such publications. By spreading tactical information widely, the channel seeks not only to instruct but to instill fear — projecting the idea that any ordinary-looking young man in a crowd could be a would-be terrorist. As Israel National News points out, this strategy magnifies psychological pressure on Israel’s civilian population while forcing its security apparatus to spread resources even thinner.

The “ordinary outward appearance” directive reflects a deliberate manipulation of daily normalcy, aiming to create paranoia among civilians and complicate the distinction between innocents and attackers.

While the Telegram channel in question is reportedly run by a Hebron resident, its references to Hamas and the adoption of Hamas-style tactics indicate a broader ideological connection. Hamas and its affiliates have long encouraged decentralized violence when direct organizational attacks become difficult, and the INN report noted how Hamas uses propaganda to incite spontaneous violence, particularly in Judea, Samaria, and Jerusalem.

Such activity also aligns with Hamas’s broader strategy of creating constant instability, undermining Israel’s sense of security, and projecting the illusion of widespread resistance.

The publication of terrorist “how-to” guides on social media platforms like Telegram serves as a stark reminder of how extremist groups and their sympathizers are adapting to the digital age. As the Israel National News report stressed, the emphasis on simple disguises, timing, forged documents, and public transit illustrates a shift toward making terrorism more accessible to individuals acting outside traditional organizational structures.

For Israel, the challenge is not only operational but psychological — countering both the immediate threat of attacks and the wider atmosphere of fear that such publications aim to cultivate. It is a chilling reminder that while the IDF dismantles tunnels in Gaza and strikes leadership abroad, the battle against terrorism is also waged in the unseen corners of cyberspace, where propaganda and tactical instruction intertwine to produce the next lone attacker.