By: Fern Sidman- Jewish Voice News

As new diplomatic frameworks accelerate around the “day after” in Gaza, a fierce debate has emerged over which nations might participate in an international stabilization force tasked with rebuilding and securing the Strip. One of America’s oldest pro-Israel advocacy groups has issued a stark warning: Turkey—given its deep, documented, and ongoing support for Hamas—must under no circumstances be permitted any role in Gaza’s future.

Americans for a Safe Israel (AFSI), founded in 1970 and long regarded as a leading voice in unapologetic, security-first pro-Israel advocacy, released a strongly worded condemnation on Monday of Ankara’s reported plans to deploy a 2,000-soldier Turkish military brigade as part of a multinational force. In a statement dripping with alarm over a diplomatic miscalculation of historic proportions, AFSI argues that allowing Turkey to operate in Gaza would be akin to bringing an arsonist to help rebuild the house it has repeatedly set ablaze.

At issue is not merely Turkey’s political posture toward Israel, which has deteriorated dramatically under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. It is Turkey’s extensive, intimate, and public relationship with Hamas—a relationship that AFSI says should disqualify it from any peacekeeping or stabilization role.

“Perversely, Turkey has long viewed Hamas as a ‘liberation movement’ and does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization,” stated Moshe Phillips, AFSI’s chairman, in a sharply worded rebuke directed at Western diplomats who have entertained Ankara’s participation. “These facts alone should rule out Turkey from having any role in Gaza.”

But the organization argues that this is only the beginning.

For years, Israeli and American intelligence services have documented how Hamas—responsible for the October 7 massacre and decades of terrorism—has used Turkey as a safe operational base. Phillips, citing these findings, emphasized that Hamas’s Turkish operations were not theoretical or incidental; they were central to the group’s global infrastructure.

Under Erdoğan’s Islamist-leaning AKP government, Turkey has hosted senior Hamas leaders, provided political legitimacy to operatives wanted by international security agencies, and served as an engine for financial activity. Hamas figures have operated real estate networks, business fronts, money laundering channels, and recruitment infrastructure from Turkish soil. Numerous terror plots thwarted by Israel have, according to intelligence reporting, traced their planning back to Istanbul and Ankara.

AFSI points out that since the 2011 prisoner exchange that freed IDF soldier Gilad Shalit in return for more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners, Turkey has effectively become home to some of Hamas’s most senior fugitives. High-ranking operatives have met frequently with Erdoğan himself and with senior Turkish intelligence officials.

Some, including former Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh—killed in July 2024—were even granted Turkish citizenship. This act, AFSI argues, crosses the line from tacit diplomatic tolerance to full-fledged political sponsorship.

Given these facts, AFSI says it is “beyond impossible” for Israel to treat Turkish soldiers as neutral peacekeepers in Gaza.

AFSI’s analysis also examines the ideological underpinnings connecting Turkey’s ruling AKP and Hamas. Both derive their political lineage from the Muslim Brotherhood, and Erdoğan has made little effort to hide his sympathies. Since October 7, the Turkish president has referred to Hamas as “mujahideen”—holy warriors—while condemning Israel in language that echoes the rhetoric of Hamas itself.

This ideological proximity, AFSI warns, makes Turkey a fundamentally compromised actor. While Turkey may publicly claim interest in a stabilization mission, its political consciousness is deeply intertwined with Hamas’s worldview.

“Peacekeepers must be trusted by all sides if they are to function effectively,” Phillips stated. “Given Turkey’s history, Israel cannot reasonably be expected to view these soldiers as neutral actors. Nor should the United States do so.”

AFSI’s warning underscores a deeper strategic concern: peacekeeping forces are effective only when their neutrality is beyond dispute. If Israel—the primary actor responsible for Gaza’s security—believes a participating nation is sympathetic to Hamas, the entire purpose of the stabilization force becomes compromised.

The pro-Israel organization’s statement comes amid growing international pressure to assemble a multinational stabilization force for postwar Gaza. Turkey, a longtime NATO member but increasingly antagonistic toward Western priorities, has signaled strong interest in contributing troops. Some diplomats argue that Turkey’s involvement could bolster international legitimacy, particularly among Muslim-majority states.

AFSI rejects this logic as dangerously naïve.

A country that has knowingly hosted Hamas leadership, facilitated its financing, and defended it diplomatically cannot be part of the apparatus intended to secure Gaza’s transition away from Hamas rule.

AFSI’s position is that including Turkey would not only undermine Israeli security but also embolden Hamas survivors and affiliates seeking to reconstitute operational capability under the protective shadow of an international mission.

As one of the oldest and most influential pro-Israel organizations in the United States, AFSI has long positioned itself as a bulwark against policies it deems disconnected from the realities of terrorism, antisemitism, and geopolitical threat. Its advocacy and educational campaigns serve as a counterweight to  “the rising tide of anti-Israel propaganda.”

In this case, Phillips argues, diplomacy must not devolve into wishful thinking.

Turkey’s involvement in Gaza would not advance peace or stability; it would introduce a fox into the henhouse.

The challenge of rebuilding Gaza in the aftermath of Hamas’s catastrophic rule requires nations that are credible, trusted and principled. These must be countries that have consistently rejected terrorism, supported counterterrorism operations, and demonstrated a willingness to operate with transparency and integrity.

Turkey does not meet this threshold.

Its record—political, financial, ideological, and operational—makes it not merely unsuitable but actively dangerous as a participant in any stabilization force.

In the view of Americans for a Safe Israel, the path ahead demands clarity rather than compromise. If the international community wishes to help Gaza rebuild, it must select partners who stand unequivocally against terrorism—not nations that have provided sanctuary to its perpetrators.

As AFSI argues, allowing Turkey a role in Gaza’s future would not heal wounds—it would deepen them.