By: Fern Sidman

As American and Iranian representatives concluded their first round of high-stakes negotiations in Oman, a parallel drama is unfolding in the shadows of formal diplomacy. According to reporting referenced by JFeed on Friday, the White House is quietly exploring what officials and advisers have come to describe as a “day after” contingency plan—an embryonic framework intended to manage the political vacuum that could follow a collapse or dramatic weakening of Iran’s ruling system under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The existence of such planning, even at a preliminary and unofficial stage, signals the extent to which Washington is hedging its bets as it approaches talks that could reshape the trajectory of one of the Middle East’s most consequential rivalries.

JFeed reported that the conceptual architecture of this contingency plan envisions the creation of a transitional governing body composed, at least in part, of Iranian-American business leaders. The effort is said to be spearheaded by Jared Kushner, senior adviser and son-in-law to President Donald Trump, who is also centrally involved in the Oman negotiations alongside Special Envoy Steve Witkoff. Sources familiar with the initiative describe Kushner as deeply engaged in assembling a network of influential expatriate Iranians who could serve as a civilian advisory council or provisional administrative structure should Tehran’s governing apparatus fracture under the weight of internal unrest, economic pressure, or geopolitical shock.

The contours of the plan, as outlined by the JFeed report, remain fluid. Officials caution that the discussions have not matured into formal policy, nor have they been codified into a publicly endorsed strategy. The White House, acutely aware of the sensitivities surrounding any hint of regime-change ambitions, has been careful to emphasize that diplomacy remains the administration’s preferred path. Yet the very existence of a “day after” blueprint underscores a dual-track approach: an overt commitment to negotiations coupled with a quiet recognition that the talks could fail, or that developments inside Iran could outpace the diplomatic calendar.

The notion of preparing for a post-Khamenei Iran reflects a broader strategic recalibration. For decades, U.S. policy toward Tehran has oscillated between containment, engagement, and coercion, often without a coherent vision of what might follow a fundamental transformation of the Islamic Republic’s power structure. The JFeed report noted that this new contingency planning, though tentative, suggests a desire to avoid the improvisational chaos that followed regime collapses elsewhere in the region. The architects of the plan appear intent on cultivating a civilian framework that could lend continuity and legitimacy to any transitional period, thereby forestalling the kind of power vacuums that have historically been exploited by terrorist factions.

According to the information provided in the JFeed report, a second strand of the initiative under consideration involves convening a summit of Iranian opposition figures in Palm Beach, Florida, near the Mar-a-Lago estate. The objective would be to explore temporary leadership arrangements and to test the viability of a cohesive civilian front capable of assuming administrative responsibilities in the event of regime destabilization. This proposed gathering, however, is reportedly mired in logistical and security challenges, reflecting the practical difficulties of orchestrating opposition unity across ideological, generational, and diaspora divides. The very diversity of Iran’s opposition—ranging from monarchists to secular liberals to ethnic minority activists—has long complicated efforts to forge a unified alternative to the existing regime.

The timing of these contingency discussions is inseparable from the diplomatic theater unfolding in Oman. On the American side, Kushner and Witkoff are expected to engage Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in talks that are intended to probe the possibility of de-escalation while pressing Washington’s core demands. White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt has reiterated that diplomacy remains the president’s first choice, but she underscored that the administration is not without alternatives. “The President has a range of other options as the Commander-in-Chief of the most powerful military in history,” she said, emphasizing that the United States retains a spectrum of coercive tools should negotiations falter.

At the center of Washington’s negotiating posture is a maximalist demand: zero nuclear capability for Iran. JFeed reports that the administration has framed this as a non-negotiable baseline, reflecting deep-seated concerns that even limited enrichment capacity could furnish Tehran with a latent pathway to weaponization. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has further clarified that “meaningful” talks must transcend the nuclear file, encompassing restrictions on ballistic missile ranges, an end to Iranian support for regional terrorist organizations, and tangible improvements in the regime’s treatment of its own citizens. This expansive agenda signals a determination to address the full spectrum of behaviors that Washington views as destabilizing, even as it risks overburdening the diplomatic process with demands that Tehran has historically resisted.

Iranian leaders, for their part, have responded to the prospect of coercion with familiar rhetoric of defiance. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has warned that any American strike would ignite a broad regional confrontation, a reminder that the stakes of miscalculation remain perilously high. The JFeed report noted that Iranian officials have framed the negotiations as a test of American intentions, wary that overtures of diplomacy may conceal preparations for confrontation. The regime’s messaging seeks to project resilience and deterrence, even as economic pressures and internal dissent complicate its domestic standing.

The coexistence of diplomatic engagement and contingency planning illuminates the administration’s dual-pronged approach. On one track, negotiators pursue a deal designed to halt escalation, constrain Iran’s strategic capabilities, and reduce the risk of open conflict. On the other, planners quietly prepare for a scenario in which the Iranian government faces deep structural upheaval, whether precipitated by internal dynamics or external shocks. The JFeed report suggests that this bifurcated strategy reflects lessons drawn from recent history: that diplomacy, while indispensable, cannot be the sole pillar of policy in a region where political orders can unravel with startling speed.

Critics of the “day after” planning warn that even preliminary discussions of transitional governance risk undermining the credibility of negotiations. From Tehran’s perspective, evidence that Washington is contemplating a post-regime framework could reinforce suspicions that the talks are less about compromise than about buying time for more disruptive ambitions. This tension is not lost on American officials, who have sought to compartmentalize the contingency discussions from the formal diplomatic track. Yet in an era of leaks and transnational media scrutiny, maintaining such compartmentalization is increasingly difficult.

Proponents of the contingency planning counter that prudence demands preparation for a range of outcomes. The collapse of authoritarian systems, they argue, often occurs with little warning, and the absence of a coherent plan for transitional governance can exacerbate instability. By cultivating relationships with Iranian-American business leaders and exploring mechanisms for civilian administration, the administration hopes to position itself to support a more orderly transition should the opportunity arise. The focus on business leaders reflects a belief that economic stewardship and technocratic competence could provide a stabilizing ballast in a volatile transitional period, even as questions remain about the political legitimacy such figures would command inside Iran.

The proposed Palm Beach summit, though embryonic, underscores the administration’s interest in testing the organizational capacity of Iran’s opposition diaspora. The JFeed report noted that bringing disparate opposition figures into a single forum could expose fault lines as readily as it could forge consensus. Yet the exercise itself signals an awareness that any post-regime scenario would require a measure of preexisting coordination to avoid fragmentation. The logistical and security hurdles facing the summit are emblematic of the broader challenges inherent in external engagement with opposition movements whose constituencies are geographically dispersed and politically heterogeneous.

As the Oman talks approach, the interplay between overt diplomacy and covert contingency planning casts a long shadow over the negotiating table. The administration’s insistence that diplomacy is the preferred path coexists uneasily with preparations for a radically different outcome. JFeed’s frequent reporting on this dual-track strategy has illuminated the delicate balancing act confronting policymakers: to project sincerity in negotiations while acknowledging the fragility of the existing regional order. The very act of planning for a “day after” Iran suggests a recognition that the status quo is not immutable, even as the path to change remains fraught with uncertainty.

In the final analysis, the administration’s quiet blueprint for a post-regime Iran reflects both strategic foresight and geopolitical anxiety. It reveals a Washington keenly aware that the outcome of the Oman talks may reverberate far beyond the nuclear dossier, touching the deeper question of Iran’s political future. Whether the contingency planning will remain an academic exercise or evolve into a concrete policy instrument will depend on the trajectory of negotiations, the resilience of Iran’s governing structures, and the unpredictable interplay of regional forces. The United States is attempting to walk a narrow path—seeking détente at the negotiating table while sketching, in the margins, a vision of what might follow if diplomacy fails and history takes a m