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By: Fern Sidman
In the aftermath of Bashar al-Assad’s departure from Syria, the chaos of a fractured nation has presented an alarming vacuum filled by figures such as Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, the controversial leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). As noted in a recently published report in The Guardian of the UK, al-Jawlani and the Islamist insurgent alliance he commands have captured significant swathes of Syria in a rapid and forceful offensive. Yet, despite his attempts to rebrand as a moderate leader, al-Jawlani’s ties to extremism and his organization’s foundation in Syria’s branch of al-Qaeda remain inescapable.
Under his leadership, HTS has sought to portray itself as a legitimate revolutionary force against Assad’s regime. However, as The Guardian of the UK report highlights, al-Jawlani’s shift in rhetoric and style is more a tactical façade than a substantive change in ideology. Thomas Pierret, a specialist in political Islam, aptly describes him as a “pragmatic radical,” emphasizing how al-Jawlani has strategically moderated his rhetoric to attract support while maintaining extremist objectives.
In an interview with CNN, al-Jawlani proclaimed, “The goal of the revolution remains the overthrow of this regime. It is our right to use all available means to achieve that goal.” These words signal his commitment to leveraging violence and terror, cloaked in the guise of revolutionary fervor. For years, he operated in the shadows, emerging only recently to lead HTS publicly and make media appearances. His calculated visibility, such as his recent visit to Aleppo’s citadel dressed in khaki fatigues, sheds light on a bid to appear relatable to his followers while distancing himself from the overt symbols of jihadism, such as the traditional turban.
Born Ahmed al-Sharaa in 1982 to a privileged family in Damascus’s affluent Mazzeh district, al-Jawlani’s trajectory is one of radical transformation. According to the information provided in The Guardian of the UK report, his journey into jihadist ideology began after the September 11, 2001 attacks, a period when he was drawn to al-Qaeda’s ideology. His later years saw him rise as a competitor to the Islamic State group, where he espoused some of the most extreme tenets of political Islam.
This ideological awakening coincided with the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, prompting him to leave Syria to join Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda in Iraq. Detained for five years, al-Jawlani’s ambitions were temporarily thwarted, but his release set the stage for his return to Syria in 2011 during the uprising against Bashar al-Assad.
Seizing the moment, he founded the al-Nusra Front, Syria’s branch of al-Qaeda, in a bid to assert influence over the burgeoning rebellion. His refusal in 2013 to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State, was less a rejection of extremism than a calculated move to maintain his allegiance to al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri, The Guardian of the UK report indicated. This decision called attention to al-Jawlani’s pragmatism: he sought to position himself as a dominant force in Syria while distancing his group from the increasingly toxic Islamic State.
In an effort to shed the image of a global jihadist and win broader support, al-Jawlani announced a break with al-Qaeda in 2016. According to the information contained in The Guardian of the UK report, he claimed this move was designed to deprive Western powers of a pretext to attack his organization. But this shift, while superficially significant, did little to alter the group’s brutal tactics or ideological core.
In 2017, al-Jawlani further consolidated power by forcing a merger between HTS and rival Islamist factions in northwestern Syria, gaining control over much of Idlib province. Under HTS rule, Idlib became a de facto state, complete with a civilian government and administrative structure. However, this veneer of governance masked widespread abuses. Residents and rights groups have accused HTS of crushing dissent with violence, accusations so severe that the UN has classified them as war crimes.
Al-Jawlani has gone to great lengths to portray himself as a moderate leader focused solely on Syria. In May 2015, he declared that his group had no intention of attacking Western targets and promised that, should Assad fall, there would be no reprisals against Syria’s Alawite minority, from which the Assad family hails. These statements were clearly calculated to allay international fears and gain local support.
However, as Aron Lund of the Century International think tank told The Guardian of the UK, these overtures are likely insincere. Lund observed that al-Jawlani’s assurances of safety to Aleppo’s Christian minority and calls for preserving security in “liberated” areas are part of a broader strategy to appear less threatening. “The less local and international panic you have and the more Jolani seems like a responsible actor instead of a toxic jihadi extremist, the easier his job will become,” Lund explained.
This façade of moderation, however, cannot mask the harsh realities of HTS’s governance. Under its rule, dissent has been met with brutal crackdowns, and the fear of reprisal looms large among religious and ethnic minorities. While al-Jawlani’s rhetoric might suggest a desire to govern responsibly, the actions of HTS betray a continuation of the same oppressive tactics that defined Assad’s regime.
As The Guardian of the UK report emphasized, the Syrian rebels who have taken control in the aftermath of Assad’s departure are no better than the authoritarian regime they replaced. Al-Jawlani’s transformation from an al-Qaeda loyalist to a supposed moderate is not a story of redemption but of opportunism. His ability to manipulate perceptions—whether by renouncing al-Qaeda, merging Islamist factions, or offering hollow assurances to minorities— shines a proverbial spotlight on his primary ambition: consolidating power at any cost.
The promises of the Syrian revolution—freedom, dignity, and democracy—remain unfulfilled as figures such as al-Jawlani rise to prominence. His leadership represents not a break from the past but a continuation of tyranny under a different guise. The international community must heed the warnings and remain vigilant against legitimizing leaders who exploit the language of revolution while perpetuating cycles of violence and oppression.
Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani is no reformer. He is a product of al-Qaeda’s ideology, a tactician who has cloaked his extremism in the rhetoric of moderation to entrench his control over a war-torn nation. The Syrian people, having endured years of conflict under Assad, now face a new brand of tyranny under HTS. As The Guardian of the UK report pointed out, the transition from Assad’s rule to HTS’s dominance offers little reprieve for a population yearning for genuine freedom and justice. The struggle for Syria is far from over, and the world must not be fooled by al-Jawlani’s calculated attempts to rewrite his legacy.
While conflicting reports emerged regarding whether al-Jawlani explicitly named Israel, his remarks, directed through Syrian state media, were widely interpreted as a challenge to Jerusalem’s military operations. Al-Jawlani emphasized that his group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), had asserted control over much of Syria, which he argued successfully diminished Iranian influence in the region. He further stressed that HTS was not pursuing further conflict but was instead focused on governance and rebuilding. The JNS report highlighted this as a notable departure from the prolonged revolutionary rhetoric that defined Syria’s civil war.
On November 27, a coalition of rebel factions, led by HTS and reportedly backed by Turkey, brought an abrupt end to Bashar Assad’s regime in an intense 11-day uprising. In response, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) launched a significant air campaign targeting Syrian military installations to prevent them from being used against the Jewish state. JNS reported that Israel’s strikes have been relentless, dismantling critical Syrian military infrastructure and reshaping the balance of power in the region.
According to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Spokesperson’s Unit, the air force’s operations have resulted in the destruction of an estimated 90% of Syria’s surface-to-air missile systems, once considered among the most formidable air defenses in the Middle East. The JNS report emphasized the severity of the damage inflicted, reflecting Israel’s intent to neutralize any potential threats emanating from Syria’s new leadership or lingering military elements.
In his media address, al-Jawlani sought to clarify HTS’s broader goals, stating, “We are currently working to meet Syrians’ primary needs. We are not seeking to engage in any conflict given Syria’s fragile state, and we are addressing the international community.” His remarks signal a strategic pivot as HTS seeks legitimacy and stability in post-Assad Syria. The JNS report noted that al-Jawlani emphasized the need to transition from a revolutionary mindset to one focused on law, institutions, and governance.
The new Syrian leadership also took a strong stance against Iran’s historic presence in the country. Al-Jawlani declared, “We successfully ended the Iranian presence and hold no hostility toward the Iranian people.” His comments appear aimed at reassuring regional and international actors that HTS’s leadership seeks to distance itself from Iran’s controversial interventions in Syria, which were a hallmark of Assad’s rule. The report on JNS interpreted this as part of a broader strategy to redefine Syria’s geopolitical alliances.
Last Monday, having taken the capital Damascus, al-Jawlani declared, “This victory, my brothers, is a victory for the entire Islamic nation.”
“This victory, my brothers, by the grace of God Almighty, follows the sacrifices of the martyrs, the widows, and the orphans. This victory, my brothers, has come through the suffering of those who endured imprisonment,” he said.
“This new triumph, my brothers, marks a new chapter in the history of the region, a history fraught with dangers that left Syria as a playground for Iranian ambitions, spreading sectarianism, stirring corruption,” he said.
Al-Jawlani appears to be carefully recalibrating his message to regional and international stakeholders, with Iran emerging as a primary target of his rhetoric. His pointed statements highlight a pivotal shift in the regional balance of power as Iran’s influence, which was entrenched in Syria during the Assad regime, faces unprecedented challenges. However, the implications of al-Jawlani’s strategy resonate far beyond Tehran, as he seeks to navigate the geopolitical complexities of a reshaped Syria while balancing his own precarious position as a leader designated by both the United States and Israel as a terrorist figure.
Iran’s role in Syria has long been a cornerstone of its broader regional ambitions. The Islamic Republic leveraged the Syrian conflict to solidify a land corridor stretching from Tehran to Beirut, facilitating its support for Hezbollah, its most powerful proxy in Lebanon. This corridor was vital for smuggling advanced weapons and resources to Hezbollah, strengthening the militant group’s ability to challenge Israel and extend Iranian influence across the Middle East.
However, al-Jawlani’s ascendance has disrupted this critical pipeline. As his forces, backed by a coalition of rebel groups, dismantled the Assad regime, Iran’s once-secure pathways were severed, cutting off critical supply routes to Hezbollah. Additionally, Iranian-backed militias in Syria have found themselves increasingly marginalized, unable to maintain their footholds in the face of HTS’s consolidation of power. Al-Jawlani’s forces have reportedly targeted Iranian-linked military infrastructure, undermining Tehran’s longstanding investment in Syria.
Furthermore, Iran’s former weapons depots in Syria, once considered untouchable under Assad, are now vulnerable. With HTS dominating much of the country and Israel continuing its aerial campaign to neutralize these caches, Tehran’s ability to use Syria as a secure staging ground for operations against Israel has significantly eroded. This loss marks a critical blow to Iran’s strategic depth in the region.
While al-Jawlani’s message directly challenges Iran, it also serves as a strategic overture to Western and Israeli powers. He faces significant challenges to his legitimacy. The U.S. government has placed a $10 million bounty on his head, shining a proverbial spotlight on the gravity of his past actions and affiliations.
However, al-Jawlani appears to understand that the early phase of his rule requires a pragmatic approach. His recognition of Western and Israeli interests in Syria is not coincidental but a calculated survival strategy. By signaling his opposition to Iran—a shared concern for the United States, Israel, and their regional allies—al-Jawlani positions himself as a potential buffer against Iranian expansionism. This message is intended to shift international perceptions, presenting HTS not as an extremist organization but as a stabilizing force capable of countering Tehran’s influence in Syria.
The message also aligns with Israel’s long-held goal of preventing Syria from becoming a launchpad for Iranian-backed militias and Hezbollah. Israel’s consistent airstrikes on Iranian targets within Syria, aimed at dismantling weapons depots and military installations, reflect its strategic imperative to neutralize threats before they materialize. Al-Jawlani’s disruption of these Iranian assets aligns, at least superficially, with Israeli interests.
Al-Jawlani’s calculated rhetoric reflects his acute awareness of his precarious position. While HTS has emerged as a dominant force in Syria, he knows that his leadership remains controversial. The West views HTS as a terrorist organization, and Israel remains wary of any extremist group operating near its borders. For al-Jawlani, the path to survival requires careful messaging and an acknowledgment of the geopolitical realities shaping Syria’s future.
In the short term, al-Jawlani’s focus appears to be on consolidating power while avoiding direct confrontation with the West and Israel. By framing his leadership as a force for stability and positioning HTS as an alternative to Iran’s malign influence, al-Jawlani hopes to secure a reprieve from international pressure. This strategy also aims to “cajole rather than challenge” global stakeholders, allowing him time to transition HTS from its revolutionary roots to a governing body that can claim legitimacy both domestically and internationally.
