Redefining Vigilance: Re-Evaluating the Meaning of Early Warning in Israel’s Security Doctrine and the October 7 Attack

Redefining Vigilance: Re-Evaluating the Meaning of Early Warning in Israel’s Security Doctrine and the October 7 Attack

By: Gil Baram & Isaac Ben Israel

Introduction

On 7 October 2023, at precisely 06:29 am, Hamas initiated a coordinated attack on towns and Kibbutzim in southern Israel, resulting in the murder of over 1,200 civilians and the abduction of more than 230 individuals. The failure was starkly revealed: the supposedly impenetrable, hyper-sophisticated underground barrier, which cost billions of dollars, was bypassed by invading Israel above the ground. The sophisticated defense systems – underground sensors, surface motion detectors, contact sensors, and smart cameras analysed by artificial intelligence (AI) and human observers – were ineffective. This failure occurred in the face of concentrated sniper fire, missiles, explosives, and inexpensive drones. The attack triggered the onset of Israel’s ‘Swords of Iron’ war against Hamas.Footnote1

Israel’s stature as a vanguard of technological innovation and a bastion of intelligence is universally acknowledged.Footnote2 For years, the Israeli public had been convinced of its military, and particularly its intelligence agencies, invincibility for various reasons, with technology playing a significant role. This fostered a perception of a military that could provide early warning, be immune to surprises, and be invincible in combat. The scant deployment of forces during the first hours of the attack highlighted the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) heavy reliance on these intelligence technologies to give Israel enough warning time. On the face of it, the core assumption that the Intelligence Services (especially the Military Intelligence – AMAN in Hebrew, or IDI – Israeli Defense Intelligence) and General Security Service (known as Shabak or Shin Bet in Hebrew) would provide an early warning against this kind of attack proved to be wrong.Footnote3

In the aftermath of the October 7 attack, a critical assessment of Israel’s security mechanisms – should be particularly its early warning capabilities – reveals significant shortcomings. It seems that, despite its technological prowess, Israel’s security apparatus failed to predict and effectively counter the attack, particularly in the first hours. This indicates a disconnect between the potential of cutting-edge technologies and intelligence capabilities to provide early warning and its practical implementation in national security protocols. Although revered for its precision and depth, the IDI seemingly did not provide the needed early warning at a critical juncture.

Scholars and practitioners have estimated that the main cause of this failure was an intelligence failure and misperception regarding Hamas’ intentions and capabilities.Footnote4 However, as time moves on, more and more reports come to light that show the intelligence existed regarding Hamas’ intentions and capabilities. We argue that the 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas revealed not just an intelligence failure in providing early warning but a deeper systemic issue within Israel’s security doctrine. This issue stems from Israel’s failure to adapt to the changing threat landscape and change accordingly its early warning concept to modern threats posed by organized non-state actors like Hamas. Despite possessing detailed intelligence about Hamas’ intentions and capabilities, Israel’s overreliance on outdated strategies led to a catastrophic attack.

The paper is structured as follows: After discussing the meaning of early warning, we first revisit Israel’s foundational security doctrine as established by its first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, in 1953 setting the stage for an in-depth exploration of the country’s historical and strategic underpinnings. Next, we delve into the development and evolution of the concept of early warning within Israel’s security doctrine, highlighting how this concept was initially designed to counter conventional military threats but has struggled to adapt to the modern threat landscape dominated by non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah.

Following this, we provide a detailed account of the October 7 attack, illustrating the stark failure of Israel’s early warning concept to adapt to the changing nature of threats. We then analyse the implications of this failure, discussing the broader consequences for Israel’s security doctrine and the need for a recalibration in light of contemporary challenges.

Early warning

Before delving into Israel’s security doctrine and the meaning of ‘early warning’ in this context, it is crucial to first explore the broader definition of early warning as understood by scholars. This will provide a foundation for comparing and contrasting Israel’s specific interpretation and application of the concept within its unique security context.

Early warning functions as a tool to predict and mitigate threats before they materialize. It has evolved from focusing solely on state-based threats to addressing a wide range of risks, including those posed by non-state actors and even environmental factors. By identifying vulnerabilities, early warning capabilities provide strategic frameworks for both anticipatory actions and long-term resilience.Footnote5 In this context, the concept of ‘warning behaviors’ involves identifying patterns and signals that indicate a heightened risk of violence or other security breaches.Footnote6

Frameworks for early warning differ widely across geopolitical contexts, reflecting varying priorities and resources. In Israeli security doctrine, early warning has been a cornerstone in the country’s security concept since the 1950s. This approach, described metaphorically as a ‘three-story building’, highlights a layered, hierarchical system of intelligence and anticipation. However, despite its integral role, gaps in standardization and conceptual clarity remain, illustrating challenges in implementing uniform practices globally.Footnote7

Sheffy offers a nuanced definition of early warning, differentiating between warnings based on enemy capabilities versus intentions. This distinction has been significant in Israel’s military history, as the focus on ‘early warning of intentions’ has often been more pronounced than on capabilities.Footnote8 In the Israeli context, as we discuss below, the meaning of ‘early warning’ was early warning of an impending attack, with the goal to have enough time (48–72 hours) for call-up of reservists.

The reason was simple: since Israel early days, the ratio between the accumulated number of the armies on its border and Israel’s army was unbearable. Only by calling all the reserves, one could reduce this ratio to reasonable one. Without the reserves there was no way Israel could win the war and stand against those invading armies. However, the threat landscape has changed, but Israel did not adjust accordingly.Footnote9

Israel’s security doctrine: historical perspective and changing point

To understand the failure of Israel’s early warning on October 7, it is essential to revisit the foundation and evolution of its national security doctrine. Historically, Israel’s security doctrine has undergone significant transformations, shaped by its unique geopolitical challenges and evolving threat landscape. Originally, Israel security doctrine was written by its first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, in 1953.Footnote10 This document remains the only national security concept officially approved by the Israeli government. In practice, Israel’s security approach has evolved through an informal consensus among decision-makers. Despite several attempts to update and formalize a new security doctrine over the years, none have received full cabinet approval.Footnote11

Historically, Israel’s security doctrine can be segmented into three phases: the initial conflict phase, from 1920 to 1947, known as ‘neighbors conflicts’, was primarily about the conflict between Arabs (Palestinians) and Jewish settlers in the Holy Land under British rule, before the establishment of independent Israel. The second phase, stretching from 1947 until the early nineties, was dominated by the threat of invasions by Arab armies. This threat gradually receded due to the effectiveness of Israeli security measures and a changing geopolitical landscape. The third phase, emerging around 1990, marked a return to focusing on the Palestinian threat – specifically in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, refugee camps in neighboring Arab countries, and the threat from non-state armed organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah.Footnote12

In Israel’s unofficial de-facto security doctrine, science and technology have always played an important role. Even before the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Jewish leadership recognized the necessity of investing heavily in human capital through education, science, and technology to ensure the survival and prosperity of the resource-poor nation. This led to the early establishment of key educational institutions: The Technion in 1922, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1925, and the Ziv Institute (later the Weizmann Institute of Science) in 1934.

Following independence, Ben-Gurion advocated for technological superiority to offset the country’s numerical disadvantage against its adversaries, as detailed in his 1953 report, the ‘Overview’.Footnote13 This document laid out the fundamentals of Israel’s security doctrine and emphasized the importance of qualitative superiority in human capital and technology. In this pivotal document, Ben-Gurion begins with an in-depth assessment and analysis of Israel’s threats. He carefully details the unique characteristics that set Israel apart from its neighboring Arab countries, establishing the foundation for the country’s strategic security stance. He concludes, ‘The foregoing determines the necessary direction of our army’s organization, its material, and its training. Because we are quantitatively inferior, we must be superior in quality’.Footnote14

Two basic assumptions are at the core of the doctrine: First, Israel should treat conflict with the Arab world as a given, regardless of any possible resolution in the near or distant future. Second, in light of its narrow security margins, a result of its geographic and demographic inferiority at its establishment, Israel is required to give the highest priority to its security concerns.Footnote15

As a result, the three pillars of Israeli security doctrine have been deterrence, early warning, and winning a decisive victory.Footnote16 The overarching objective of Ben-Gurion’s doctrine is to ensure Israel’s survival by inflicting significant damage on the adversary, thereby leading to a point where the enemy questions the viability of continuing their hostile actions against Israel. This approach is an embodiment of the ‘Iron Wall’ doctrine, which posits that its adversaries, realizing the futility of attempting to destroy the Israeli state, will ultimately accept Israel’s existence not necessarily due to a recognition of its legitimacy, but somewhat out of a sense of resignation or despair, once they will come to the conclusion Israel cannot be eliminated by force.Footnote17

In this context it is worth mentioning the ‘Mowing the Grass’, strategy against hostile non-state groups.Footnote18 Despite these adaptations, Israel appears to have a conspicuous gap in its military strategy: the absence of a comprehensive counterinsurgency doctrine. This lack of a counterinsurgency approach could be viewed as a critical strategic oversight. The absence of a well-defined counterinsurgency doctrine may have contributed to a strategic cultural bias within Israeli military thinking. This bias, in turn, could have played a role in the analytical failure to anticipate and understand Hamas’ war plans. The focus on conventional warfare and periodic ‘mowing the grass’ operations may have left Israel ill-prepared to address the complexities of long-term insurgency management and conflict resolution in Gaza.

New threats same security doctrine

Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine has proven to be remarkably enduring. Israel successfully addressed the collective strength of Arab countries, aligning with Ben-Gurion’s vision and predictions in his security writings. Interestingly, the effectiveness of Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine and the reduced threat of foreign regular armies invasions have brought the internal conflict with the Palestinians to the forefront. While disruptive and detrimental, this enduring conflict was not deemed an existential threat like foreign occupation.

Thus, it was often secondary when the imminent threat of foreign invasions loomed. However, with the diminished threat from neighboring Arab armies, Israel’s focus has shifted more towards the historical land dispute with the local Arab population.Footnote19 It is important to note that the focus on non-state terror organizations was a global trend, as many countries – particularly the United States – started investing in counter-terrorism capabilities after the 9/11 terror attack.Footnote20

Since the 1990s, Israel’s primary threats transitioned from state actors to non-state organizations, like Hamas and Hezbollah. The landscape has evolved to include terrorist and guerrilla warfare tactics, evident in the two Intifadas, confrontations with Hamas, and the conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon, culminating in the Second Lebanon War in 2006.Footnote21 This shift emphasizes the dynamic and multifaceted nature of security concerns in the regionFootnote22 and necessitated adaptations in early warning systems and strategies.Footnote23

However, despite the critical importance of technological superiority and the heavy reliance of Israel’s strategic security establishment and decision-makers on this advantage for security and military defense, it has not been addressed comprehensively.Footnote24 Addressing a localized conflict required different strategies and approaches than those employed in large-scale warfare.

Early warning in the Israeli security doctrine

One of the core principles established by Ben-Gurion is the concept of ‘early warning’. This principle mandates a minimum notification period of 48–72 hours before engaging in war, primarily to facilitate the recruitment and mobilization of reserve forces. The arithmetic was simple: the combined forces of Arab armies positioned along Israel’s borders were approximately ten times bigger than the IDF. This ratio of 10:1 was unbearable. Mobilizing all the reserves reduced it to 4:1 and gave a hope that with proper superiority in technology, Israel would be able to win the war. Thus, early warning for call-up of reservists became a central component in the Israeli security doctrine.Footnote25

As mentioned earlier, Israel’s security doctrine was built on the assumption that the main threat the country needs to deal with is the threat of its Arab neighbours’ militaries invading the country and occupying it. Deterrence meant that Israel should do anything in its power to prevent war. This is where technology comes in. From the Israeli perspective, technology plays a pivotal role in its ability to deter its enemies, serving not just as a means to prevent harm and maintain citizens’ safety but also as a powerful tool that underscores a warning: ‘Engage in hostile actions and face the formidable force of our advanced technological capabilities’. Should deterrence failed and war become an unavoidable fact, Israel needed an early warning ability allowing it to recall reserves in time to defeat an attack. Throughout Israel’s history, we can see that deterrence did not work as expected since every five years, on average, Israel engaged in a war or large-scale military operation. This is why the second element of Israel’s national security doctrine – early warning – became critical.

The principle of early warning in the security doctrine is deeply intertwined with the concepts of time and space. The greater the distance between you and your enemy, the more time you have. Early warning does not prevent the war but it gives the military enough time to prepare for it. In the Israeli context, the meaning of early warning is giving the military two to three days to call the reservist. This distinction arises from the numerical disparities in military strength. The perceived threat of Arab armies crossing into Israeli territory has always been a concern. The IDI faces a unique challenge that the United States does not share.

Unlike the US, Israel is under constant threat of invasion from forces significantly larger than its own military and border guard. This reality necessitates a robust early warning capabilities, an essential aspect of Israeli security doctrine. Israel operated under the ever-present risk that an army ten times its size could launch an invasion without an extended period of military buildup or signals to provide more strategic warning. Without its reserve forces, such an invasion could swiftly lead to the occupation of major cities like Tel Aviv. This emphasizes the crucial role of technology and early warning in Israel’s defense strategy to compensate for the numerical disparity in military strength.

One of the key strategic priorities for Israel, particularly in the context of the IDI, has been to maintain a safe distance from potential threats, such as the Egyptian army before the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. This strategy was not about defeating the Egyptians directly but rather about creating a buffer zone for earning time to call the reserves. The establishment of defensive bastions and the strategic positioning of a second line at the Suez Straits served a critical purpose: to provide a delay and buy the necessary time needed. This buffer zone was crucial, as it would allow Israel more time to mobilize and organize its defense. Such an approach was essential in the Israeli security doctrine to counterbalance the numerical superiority of Arab armies. Even when caught by surprise in 1973, resulting in the first two or three days of the war being exceptionally challenging, the mobilization of these reserves, coupled with advanced technology, ultimately shifted the tide in Israel’s favor.

Despite Israel’s concerted efforts to bolster its forces through both reserve and mandatory conscription, the numerical imbalance was glaringly evident during the Yom Kippur War. During the first days, the combined Egyptian and Syrian armies were about ten times larger than Israel’s, presenting an insurmountable numerical challenge. Consequently, Israel had to rapidly expand its military through reservist forces, effectively doubling its size. In scenarios where the opposing force is ten times as large, relying on technology and early warning systems becomes even more crucial in the Israeli security doctrine, acknowledging that sheer numbers alone cannot be the sole factor in maintaining national security. It is worth noting that Israel signed a peace agreement with Egypt in 1979 (and with Jordan in 1994) and Israel was willing to give up the land in exchange for the peace treaty. As a result, the nature of the threat has changed, but the Israel security doctrine stayed the same.

Israel’s security landscape has undergone a dramatic transformation since the pre-1990 era, shifting from existential threats posed by neighboring states to a more complex array of challenges from non-state actors, precision weaponry, and cyber threats. The window for early warning has significantly narrowed, and the tolerance for casualties – both military and civilian – has drastically decreased. Consequently, Israel has pivoted towards more agile, technology-driven defense strategies that emphasize immediate threat neutralization and force protection.

The unique place of the Israeli defense intelligence

Israel is the only liberal democracy today in which a military intelligence service functions as the leading national intelligence estimator. The unique Israeli model has been usually justified by Israel’s security concerns – primarily the threat of a sudden conventional attack.Footnote26 Early warning capabilities are highly dependent on intelligence. In the landscape of Israel’s intelligence and assessment agencies, the Israeli military’s intelligence corps, IDI, holds a preeminent position as the principal national intelligence assessor. This status is distinct from the role typically played by military intelligence services in other democratic nations. Unlike its counterparts elsewhere, the IDI’s scope of operations extends well beyond traditional military intelligence. It encompasses a broad range of intelligence activities, including those of state affairs. This expanded jurisdiction places the IDI, particularly its assessment and estimate division, in a unique position. Its officers are frequently required to engage with sensitive topics deeply entwined in the fabric of Israeli political discourse and public debate. This role necessitates a nuanced approach to intelligence gathering and analysis, as it intersects with complex and often contentious domestic issues.Footnote27

Early warning has been one of the core missions of the IDI since its early days in the 1950. In the context of the Yom Kippur intelligence failure, Shapira claims that despite the IDI’s efforts to conceptualize and institutionalize early warning systems for decades, the Yom Kippur failure highlights the lack of a clear and coherent definition, particularly in terms of balancing adversary intentions and capabilities. For decades, the IDI strove to develop and implement early warning systems. However, the Yom Kippur War exposed a critical flaw: the absence of a well-defined and consistent framework, especially when it came to weighing an adversary’s intentions against their military capabilities.Footnote28

Here we can point out on a different type of intelligence failure – a failure to redefine the security doctrine in response to evolving threats and the rise of non-state actors. This is a core failure: If Israel had evaluate differently the non-state actors threat and re-adjusted its understanding of what was required of its early warning system to be successful in order to deal with this kind of threat, then it may not have failed to the same degree.

Given the IDI’s unique role as the ‘national estimator’ beyond traditional intelligence matters, the IDF and IDI’s commanders did not adequately consider necessary changes in the security doctrine that could have had an impact on IDI’s status and position as the national estimator.Footnote29 Bar Joseph argues that ‘its [the IDI] military characteristics create inherent weaknesses that hamper its ability to serve as a high-quality national intelligence estimator’.Footnote30 Furthermore, The Agranat Commission, established to investigate the intelligence failures preceding the Yom Kippur War of 1973, made several key recommendations to improve Israel’s intelligence analysis capabilities. One of the most significant recommendation was to end the IDI’s monopoly on national intelligence assessments.Footnote31

Intelligence assessment and bias

It is necessary to distinguish between the capability of intelligence collection, which can and should be improved through technology, and the element of assessment, which is dependent on human reasoning and, thus, cognitive biases.Footnote32 Regarding assessment, technology can be useful in adopting better evaluation methods, but one must always account for the potential for failure. The practice of gathering and analyzing intelligence, including national assessments and estimations, brings the challenge of human biases and cognitive processes into sharp focus.Footnote33 The unavoidable conclusion is that errors (or incorrect assessments) are a natural part of the process. Although some intelligence assessment methods might be more effective than others might – including ones that are based on technological means – the presence of uncertainty ensures that errors will occur.Footnote34 So it is crucial to modify the approach to early warning to acknowledge these human biases, accepting that mistakes are unavoidable. One of us, after analyzing the roots of the Intelligence 1973 estimate failure, came to the conclusion that ‘normal’ estimates were (and still are) based on wrong logic of inference, and that a better method should be based on the logic of hypotheses and refutation.Footnote35

The paradoxical relationship between collection technology and estimation of success

On the face of it, it seems that the better intelligence collection is, the less we need to estimate what is going to happen. If we can put our hands on any order given by any commander on the other side, and any movement of forces etc. in real time, it seems we do not need to estimate what is going to happen anymore. We may think we know, and therefore do not need to estimate. Let us say here that it is a dangerous illusion. It is enough to raise the possibility that the enemy is aware of our deep coverage, and use it to mislead us. Intelligence agencies invest a lot in collection technology. The age we live in, in which everyone carries a smartphone and a laptop, and all these devices are usually connected to large networks, makes the world more and more transparent. Paradoxically, this may lead to what we have just described, and increase the illusion we do not need any human interpretation of the hard intercepted data.

This highlights the need for a security doctrine that anticipates the inevitability of surprise, focusing on the time it might take to respond. In the IDI there was also a confusion regarding intentions and capabilities as was evident during the Yom Kippur war.Footnote36

Conclusion about early warning and Israel security doctrine

All the above analysis raises the question: How do we prepare for potential surprises when the enemy is just minutes away and early warning in its original meaning is much less relevant? Obviously, the IDF should have a ready force positioned minutes away from the Gaza border, even without receiving an alert or depending on technological capabilities. The assumption that an early warning can be issued in time to allow a mobilization of supporting forces, and that the observation towers on the fence will provide that timely warning, was flawed. This is due to the failure to update the principles of the security doctrine to effectively address the type of threat from terror organizations located near the Israeli border.

Effective early warning requires integrating several key elements: abstract theoretical frameworks, concrete positive information, the observer’s perception of the adversary, and the observer’s values and objectives. While signposts, or indicators, are valuable in assessing strategic intentions, they cannot substitute for abstract conceptual thinking. This is true with every intelligence collection and analysis type, which suffers from inherent human bias.

Intelligence reports suggested that Hamas was preparing for an attack, but the critical failure occurred in the interpretation and dissemination of this information. While raw data was available, its implications were misunderstood or dismissed, preventing it from evolving into an effective early warning. When analysts raised alarms, their assessments were systematically downplayed or ignored at multiple levels of command, reflecting a broader problem in the early warning process.Footnote37

The commander of the Southern Command’s assertion that Hamas’ preparations were routine practice illustrates a critical flaw in perception, creating a dangerous complacency that blinded decision-makers to potential threats. This case demonstrates that the mere presence of intelligence does not equate to an effective early warning.

Analysis: the October 7 attack and the failure of early warning

The October 7 attack

On the early morning of 7 October 2023, Hamas launched a coordinated massive attack on towns and Kibbutzim in southern Israel, murdering more than 1,200 civilians and kidnapping more than 230 hostages.Footnote38 This led to the beginning of Israel’s ‘Swords of Iron’ war against Hamas.Footnote39

The attack on October 7 stands as one of the most lethal in Israel’s history since its establishment, marking a new high in the magnitude of fatalities. According to the Global Terrorism Database, which has been collecting data since 1970, this attack represents the highest per capita death rate from a single terrorist incident, with a ratio of approximately one death per 10,000 Israeli citizens. This statistic underscores the profound national impact and collective sense of loss experienced by Israel. To put this into perspective, as President Joe BidenFootnote40 noted, this is proportionally akin to a hypothetical scenario where between 40,000 and 50,000 Americans had perished in the attacks of 11 September 2001.Footnote41

The war that began on October 7 highlighted the failure of a strategy overly reliant on early warning against Arab armies and not against non-state organizations. Hamas, undeterred, inflicted a significant blow on state of Israel. However, the evening before Hamas executed its plan, the head of the Shin Bet raised the possibility of this impending action. A discussion ensued among key security personnel, including the head of the Shin Bet, the commander of the Gaza Division, the commander of the Southern Command, and the Commander of the IDF. Despite deliberating, they concluded that the intelligence was not conclusive and decided to reconvene in the morning.

Crucially, the division commander should have placed a high alert as a precautionary measure. He had the authority to do so without needing additional permission. However, he did not take this action, leaving the division not alert. This oversight highlights a significant gap in the readiness and responsiveness of the security forces in this instance. It can also demonstrate a deeper perception gap regarding the meaning of early warning, as it reveals a critical disconnect between intelligence gathering and proactive defensive measures in the face of non-traditional threats, reflecting a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of early warning in the context of non-state threats.

The failure to provide early warning

On October 6, between 3,000 and 4,000 Nukhba terrorists were positioned merely meters away from the fences of the Israeli settlements. In such a scenario, this distance translates to only a few minutes of response time and highlights a critical point: the belief that the intelligence capabilities would provide timely alerts was outdated and more suited for confronting more distant threats that would take more time to activate and attack. In situations where the potential threats are nearby, relying on early warning that allows the mobilization in under two minutes is impractical and dangerously optimistic.Footnote42

Israel’s defense and warning system against attacks from Gaza was built around three layers. The first focuses on the Shin Bet’s human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, tasked with alerting about the Hamas leadership’s plans to strategize, organize, and launch a significant attack. The second layer utilized IDI’s capabilities, especially cyber and signal intelligence (e.g., unit 8200) and imagery intelligence (unit 9900), aimed at collecting evidence of Hamas’s preparations for an attack. The third layer was the extensive underground barrier along the Gaza border, incorporating physical barriers, electronic sensors, and visual aids to thwart any infiltration attempts into Israel.Footnote43

In the October 7 attack, Israel’s early warning systems were inadequately prepared. Unlike fortified areas, the above-ground defense relied on a fence, which could easily be breached using wire cutters, as indeed happened. Additionally, the defensive force, although technically present as a division, was not actively on alert and could be considered ‘asleep’ in terms of its readiness. Had the Gaza division commander been fully alert and prepared, the outcome of the attack might have been different.

With soldiers positioned strategically, some 40 tanks in firing positions, and helicopter gunships at the ready, the defense would have been significantly more robust during the first hours of the attack. Furthermore, the Israeli Air Force was also left out of the loop. The Air Force commander learned about the attack through the news and was not involved in the critical decision-making processes the day before. This lack of coordination and alertness represents a significant lapse in the IDF’s early warning and response system.Footnote44

On the border with Gaza, there is a constant presence of Israeli military strength, exemplified by the Gaza Division. This division’s role is crucial in potentially delaying Hamas until additional IDF forces arrive. Although it took a day for the rest of the army to arrive, the primary objective of the Gaza Division was to hold off the enemy for at least that duration. The division might only be capable of a little beyond this, but providing the IDF with a day to arrive was vital. The critical failure in this context was the reliance on receiving an early warning and the assumption that forces would always be on standby. This was not an intelligence failure per se, as the situation differed from the Yom Kippur War, where the dynamics of time and space in intelligence and military response played out differently.

In an unpublished investigation report, the commander of unit 8200 said, ‘Hamas’s unexpected attack, executed with military precision rather than guerrilla tactics, caught us off guard’. This realization highlighted a significant oversight: this lack of awareness regarding the details of Hamas’s ‘Walls of Jericho’ plan, which 8200 had intercepted a year and a half earlier. In an operation in 2022, unit 8200 successfully acquired Hamas’s comprehensive attack plan. The documents, spanning dozens of pages, were written in detailed Arabic and outlined the actions witnessed on October 7 in Beeri, Kfar Aza, Sderot, and Ofakim. With possession of this detailed plan, the focus should have shifted away from speculating about Hamas’s intentions or their state of deterrence; these become secondary concerns.Footnote45

In May 2023, Hamas practiced its plan in the same manner it executed it on October 7. As a former Intelligence official said, ‘The problem was that there was no involvement with the Hamas plan. They believed in the conception […] It is like raising a Rottweiler in a house with children. You have to consider what happens if it tears the leash and the barrier. You have to have an answer. And there wasn’t’.Footnote46

An overreliance on technology in intelligence assessment

Technology plays a crucial role in enhancing efficiency and simplifying military tasks, often even saving human lives, be it in cybersecurity or the protective armor on tanks.Footnote47 The challenge arises when one starts believe that technology is flawless. For example, the head of the Shin Bet, Ronen Bar, stated in 2023 (before the war) that the organization has adopted AI technologies, including those similar to ChatGPT, to predict threats. He noted that a third of the Shin Bet’s workforce is focused on technology.Footnote48

A former intelligence officer in the Southern Command and intelligence assistant in the Prime Minister’s Office, referred to the significant oversight of October 7: ‘All the observers saw things, they reported, but the significance [of their reports] was not fully grasped. The truth is, it really surprised all of us, but it should not have. Because, at least from what I know, before the underground barrier was established, the IDF, and certainly the Gaza Division, were preparing for this scenario. Hamas had capabilities, Israeli intelligence had information about these capabilities, and there was a need to analyse the potential scenarios for utilizing those capabilities’.Footnote49 This overreliance on technology along with the undated threat perception led to tactical failure to provide early warning as well.

The IDF was warned about its overreliance on technology. The warning can be broken down into two main points. First, it cautions that some of the technologies prioritized by the IDF may not deliver the anticipated results. Just like in real-life scenarios, issues that appear solvable in a controlled laboratory setting may prove ineffective when examined in the complex environment of the battlefield. Second, and perhaps more concerning, these technologies have vulnerabilities like any technological system. The greater the sophistication and centralization of these systems, the more susceptible they become to damage from a single point of failure, potentially compromising a wide range of capabilities.Footnote50 According to Intelligence officer of the Armored Corps, ‘AMAN (IDI) has become overly reliant on information systems and technology, neglecting the essence of intelligence. We have become overly dependent on technology; AMAN has turned into a sort of high-tech company’.Footnote51

Was the entire intelligence apparatus erred by overly relying on computerized collection and predictions, thereby diminishing the value of human thought and analysis? Technology was effectively integrated into the intelligence collection process, but it seems it weakened the estimate process and led eventually to the Intelligence failure on October 7. The technologies for intelligence collection functioned flawlessly.Footnote52

The issue was their integration into the intelligence assessment, analysis and estimation process and the overall IDF combat strategy. This applies both on a micro level – assessing the threat from an individual enemy, and on a macro level – determining which IDF units should be perpetually on alert at the border. The conclusion should not be that developing or depending on advanced technologies is unnecessary. These technologies were vital for offsetting the IDF’s inherent quantitative disadvantage against its enemies. However, overreliance on technology in the expanse of intelligence officers, made the IDF believe it would have enough time ahead to prepare and be ready for the attack. We have already saw that the IDF did not update the meaning of the early warning concept in its security doctrine.Footnote53

When hundreds of Hamas terrorists breached a fence and reached a kibbutz within minutes, what intelligence technology could effectively prevent it? Every military organization should constantly question, ‘What if I do not receive an early warning? What if there is a failure in the systems we rely on today?’ Failures are inevitable, but this time, the consequences have been far too costly.Footnote54

Conclusion

The October 7 attack by Hamas starkly illustrated significant shortcomings in Israel’s security doctrine, reflecting its inability to adapt to the changing threats. Despite having advanced technology and intelligence systems, Israel was caught off guard, leading to catastrophic consequences. This incident highlighted not only an intelligence failure but also a deeper systemic issue within Israel’s security doctrine: a failure to adapt its strategies to modern time in which the threats are posed by non-state actors, and not necessarily by invading armies.

The paper asserts that Israel, long regarded as a technological innovator and intelligence powerhouse, was caught off guard by Hamas’s October 7 attack. This attack allegedly contradicted the longstanding national belief in the Israeli military’s invincibility, heavily underpinned by technological superiority. It exposed vulnerabilities in the nation’s security apparatus, particularly its intelligence assessment and early warning capabilities.

However’ our main conclusion is that a critical aspect of the failure was in the analysis of the intelligence received about Hamas’ intentions and capabilities, not a lack of intelligence collection capabilities. We argue that the attack represents more than intelligence oversight; it highlights a fundamental breakdown in the concept of ‘early warning’, a cornerstone of Israel’s security doctrine. The core problem lies in the failure to adapt the early warning concept in Israel’s national security doctrine to modern threats from non-state actors like Hamas. Despite having detailed intelligence on Hamas’ plans and capabilities, Israel’s overreliance on technology for intelligence assessment and outdated strategies resulted in a devastating surprise attack.

Our investigation into the historical evolution of Israel’s security doctrine, from its inception by David Ben-Gurion to the present day, highlights a significant oversight in adapting to the changing threat landscape. The traditional pillars of deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory, while effective against conventional Arab armies, fall short in addressing the complexities of modern terrorism. The October 7 attack illustrates the stark consequences of this misalignment, prompting a reevaluation of how early warning is conceptualized and operationalized in an era dominated by non-state threats.

Israel’s early warning concept, originally designed to counter conventional military threats from neighboring Arab states, proved inadequate in the face of Hamas’s October 7 attack. This failure stems from two key factors: First, the evolving nature of threats in Israel’s security landscape was not fully incorporated into the early warning doctrine. While Israel’s security focus shifted from state actors to non-state organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah since the 1990s, the core principles of early warning remained largely unchanged.

The concept of providing a 48–72-hour notice before engaging in war, primarily to facilitate the mobilization of reserve forces, became obsolete when facing an enemy positioned just meters away from Israeli settlements. Second, there was an overreliance on technology in intelligence collection on the expense of intelligence assessment and estimation. The technological sophistication of collection systems led to a false sense of security and diminished the value of human analysis and estimate. The October 7 attack exposed the critical flaw in this approach. Despite possessing Hamas’s comprehensive attack plan, intercepted a year and a half earlier, and observing a practice run in May 2023, the significance of this intelligence was not fully grasped.

The recognition that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a longstanding issue, likely to persist for generations, necessitates an understanding that Israelis and Palestinians are destined to coexist for many years. This reality differs from an existential war, where survival is in question. Therefore, one of the key tenets of an updated security doctrine for this ‘third era’ should be considering the impact of Israeli actions (before, during, and after combat) on the relationship between the two nations. These modifications are intended to enhance the foundation of the early warning system by adding new tasks that address the complexities and dynamics of the rapidly changing global landscape.Footnote55

Israel should view early warning capabilities not just as a technological or intelligence issue but as a fundamental aspect of its security doctrine that requires comprehensive adaptation. This involves changing intelligence practices to better understand non-state actors and re-evaluating military readiness to ensure rapid response capabilities against shorter warning timelines. The lessons learned from recent events underscore the urgency for such changes in order to enhance national security more effectively.

Moreover, the revised security doctrine should integrate strategies for rehabilitating the Palestinian economy. This could involve initiatives to facilitate Palestinians moving out of refugee camps and shedding their ‘refugee’ status, assimilating into their current environments, and other related objectives. These components are essential for a comprehensive and forward-looking security doctrine that acknowledges the complexities of the Israeli-Palestinian dynamic.Footnote56 Certain elements of the old Israeli security doctrine, which for 75 years helped it to survive, have become obsolete.

In terms of future research, it is important to note that while the Israeli experience in 2023 is unique it has some characteristics in common with other warning failures. As a results, it provides valuable insights into the understanding of strategic warning more generally. We recognize three main directions for future research. First, it should focus on developing a nuanced understanding of early warning in the context of asymmetric warfare and terrorism. This includes reevaluating Israel’s strategic doctrine – comprising deterrence, early warning, and decisive victory – to ensure it is responsive to contemporary security challenges, particularly those posed by non-state actors.

Second, research could investigate how technological innovations can be more effectively integrated with intelligence estimations conducted by human analysts to enhance early warning capabilities. The balance between technology and human oversight is crucial to interpreting complex signals and anticipating unconventional tactics. Third, the Israeli intelligence misinterpretation of Hamas’ capabilities and intentions in the years prior to the October 7 attack could be analysed to study the impact of cognitive biases on security assessments. Further research is needed to systematically identify these biases and develop de-biasing techniques or methodologies that can further improve the accuracy and reliability of intelligence analysis.

THIS ARTICLE ORIGINALLY APPEARED ON TAYLOR & FRANCIS ONLINE – Click on this link: tandfonline.com

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Notes on contributors

Gil Baram

Gil Baram is a senior lecturer at the Department of Political Studies at Bar Ilan University. Additionally, and a non-resident research scholar at the Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity and the Berkeley Risk and Security Lab (joint appointment) University of California Berkeley. Her research interests encompass various aspects of emerging technologies, security and society.

Isaac Ben Israel

Isaac Ben Israel is currently the head of the Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center (ICRC) at Tel-Aviv University and head of the Yuval Ne’eman Workshop for Science Technology and Security at Tel Aviv University.

Notes

1 Beaule, “A Detailed Look at How Hamas Secretly Crossed into Israel”; and The Institute for National Security Studies, “Swords of Iron: An Overview.” On Hamas’s motivation to act against Israel, see also Ganor Citation2013.

2 See, for example, Wrobel, “Tel Aviv Moves up to 5th Place in Annual Ranking of Best Global Tech Ecosystems”; and De Haan and Golany, “The Land of Milk, Honey and Ideas.”

3 Dror Globerman, “What the world will learn from October 7?,” Dror Goberman weekly newsletter, December 23, 2023, https://us14.campaign-archive.com/?u=115804e847eca0813f25d9a49&id=a24e237e8e.; Yaniv Kubovich, “Israel Completes Vast, Billion-Dollar Gaza Barrier,” Haaretz, December 7, 2021, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2021-12-07/ty-article/.premium/israel-completes-vast-billion-dollar-gaza-barrier/0000017f-ee2c-d4cd-af7f-ef7c25d40000.; Emily Harding, “How Could Israeli Intelligence Miss the Hamas Invasion Plans?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 11, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-could-israeli-intelligence-miss-hamas-invasion-plans.; and Daniel Estrin, Peter Kenyon, and Larry Kaplow, “Israel Is Trying to Regain Full Control of Its Territory Following Hamas Attack,” NPR, October 9, 2023, https://www.npr.org/2023/10/08/1204539821/israel-trying-to-regain-full-control-of-its-territory-day-after-hamas-attack.

4 Center for New America Security, “Examination of Israel’s Intelligence and Policy Failures in the Yom Kippur War and Hamas Attack, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D0sqTLemeqE.; Uri Bar-Joseph and Avner Cohen, “How Israel’s Spies Failed – and Why Escalation Could Be Catastrophic,” Foreign Policy, October 19, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/19/israel-intelligence-gaza-nuclear-weapons-hezbollah-iran-escalation-could-be-catastrophic/.; and Elena Grossfeld, “What Israeli Intelligence Got Wrong About Hamas,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/11/israel-intelligence-gaza-hamas-war-1973/.

5 Gentry, “Warning Analysis”; and Bielawski, “Contemporary Indicators of Security.”

6 Reid Meloy et al., “The Role of Warning Behaviors in Threat Assessment.”

7 Hershkovitz, “‘A Three-Story Building’: A Critical Analysis of Israeli Early Warning Discourse.”

8 Sheffy, “Early Warning of Intentions or of Capabilities?.”

9 On the responsibility of the early warning failure and different categorization of early warning see Ehud Eiran, Ofer Guterman, and David Simantov, “Israel’s Oct. 7 Early Warning Failure: Who Is to Blame?,” War on the Rocks, October 4, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/10/israels-oct-7-early-warning-failure-who-is-to-blame/.

10 Ben-Gurion, “Tzava U-Medina [Army and State].”

11 For more details, see Isaac Ben Israel, Israel Security Doctrine, Ministry of Defense Press, 2013.

12 Ben Israel, Israel’s Security Doctrine, 11.

13 Ben-Gurion, “Tzava U-Medina [Army and State].” See also Ben Israel, “Security, Technology and the Future Battlefield,” 2001; Tabansky and Ben Israel, Cybersecurity in Israel;

The relevance of Ben-Gurion’s strategy has been continually reassessed in light of the evolving Middle Eastern political landscape and shifting security threats. Various efforts to update Israel’s national security doctrine, such as the Meridor Commission Report (2006), Chief of Staff Dan Halutz’s document (2006), and the IDF Strategy by Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot (2015), reflect ongoing attempts to adjust to these challenges. However, none of them has been officially approved by the government. See also Brun and Rabinovich, Israel Facing a New Middle East: In Search of a National Security Strategy. 2017.

14 Ben Israel, “Security, Technology and the Future Battlefield,” 2001, cited at Paikowsky and Ben Israel, “Science and Technology for National Development.”

15 Ben-Dor, Pedahzur, and Hasisi, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine under Strain.”

16 Inbar, “Israeli National Security, 1973–96,” 73.

17 Hershkovitz, “‘A Three-Story Building’.”

18 Inbar and Shamir, “‘Mowing the Grass.’.”

19 Ben Israel, Israel’s Security Doctrine, 10.

20 Heeley, “Counterterrorism Spending.”

21 See Marcus, “The Israeli Revolution in Military Affairs and the Road to the 2006 Lebanon War,” and also Bar-Joseph, “Israel’s Military Intelligence Performance in the Second Lebanon War.”

22 Ben Israel, Israel’s Security Doctrine, 10–11.

23 Cohen-Almagor and Guiora (2020). Israel’s Democracy and Security.

24 Matania, Podhorzer, and Daniel, “The Elusive Presence of Technology in Israel’s Strategic Security Thinking,” 29.

25 Inbar, Israeli National Security, 1973–96.

26 Bar-Joseph, “Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator.”

27 Pascovich, “Military Intelligence and Controversial Political Issues: The Unique Case of the Israeli Military Intelligence.”

28 Shapira, “The Yom Kippur Intelligence Failure after Fifty Years,” 983–84.

29 Cohen and Gooch analyze the Yom Kippur intelligence failure, offering a nuanced perspective that diverges from traditional categorizations. Instead of labeling it solely as an intelligence or warning failure, they propose a more comprehensive interpretation: a failure of net assessment. This approach bears resemblance to the concept of failing to adapt security strategies in response to evolving threat landscapes. Both viewpoints emphasize the importance of holistic evaluation and the need for dynamic, responsive security frameworks that can effectively integrate new information and changing circumstances. See Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War.

30 Bar-Joseph, “Military Intelligence as the National Intelligence Estimator.”

31 Oren, “A Revisionist View of the Intelligence Failure of the Yom Kippur War”; and Shapira, “The Yom Kippur Intelligence Failure after Fifty Years.”

32 Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Whitesmith, Cognitive Bias in Intelligence Analysis: Testing the Analysis of Competing Hypotheses Method; Belton and Dhami, “Cognitive Biases and Debiasing in Intelligence Analysis.” Rønn, “The Multifaceted Norm of Objectivity in Intelligence Practices.”

33 Pronin, “Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment”; and Mellers et al., “The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis.”

34 Whitesmith, “The Efficacy of ACH in Mitigating Serial Position Effects and Confirmation Bias in an Intelligence Analysis Scenario”; and Brand, “Mind Games”; and Gartner, “All Mistakes Are Not Equal.” Morrison, “British Intelligence Failures in Iraq.” On bias in intelligence assessments caused by the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), see Vogel et al., “The Impact of AI on Intelligence Analysis: Tackling Issues of Collaboration, Algorithmic Transparency, Accountability, and Management.”

35 Ben Israel, The Philosophy of Military Intelligence; Ben Israel, Dialogues on Science and Military Intelligence.

36 Shapira, “The Yom Kippur Intelligence Failure after Fifty Years,” 983–84.

37 Devori, “Officers at 8200 alerted, a senior commander replied: ‘These are fantasies.’.”

38 In his speech on October 10, 2023, US President Joe Biden described this attack.

“Infants in their mothers’ arms, grandparents in wheelchairs, Holocaust survivors abducted and held hostage – hostages whom Hamas has now threatened to execute in violation of every code of human morality. It’s abhorrent. The brutality of Hamas – this bloodthirstiness – brings to mind the worst – the worst rampages of ISIS. This is terrorism.”

39 October 7 Survivor Stories 2023; Physicians for Human Rights 2023.

40 The White House. “Remarks by President Biden on the Terrorist Attacks in Israel,” Accessed October 10, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speechesremarks/2023/10/10/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-terroristattacks-in-israel-2/

41 Daniel Byman et al., “Hamas’s October 7 Attack: Visualizing the Data,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 19, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data.; Avner Barnea, “Israeli Intelligence Was Caught Off Guard: The Hamas Attack on 7 October 2023—A Preliminary Analysis,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, March 26, 2024, 1–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2024.2315546.; and Ariel (Eli) Levite, “Israeli Security After October 7” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 21, 2024), https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/02/21/israeli-security-after-october-7-pub-91702.

42 Ronen Bergman and Patrick Kingsley, “How Israel’s Feared Security Services Failed to Stop Hamas’s Attack,” The New York Times, October 10, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/10/world/middleeast/israel-gaza-security-failure.html#:~:text=How%20Israel’s%20Feared%20Security%20Services,defenses%20in%20half%20a%20century.

In this context, there was another aspect that was not taken into account by the IDI – the exploitation of Israeli casualty aversion. This was apparent in the fact that on October 7 more than 230 Israelis (and foreign workers) were kidnapped from the Kibbutzim into Gaza.

43 Bar-Joseph and Cohen, “How Israel’s Spies Failed – and Why Escalation Could Be Catastrophic”; and Granados et al., “How Hamas Breached Israel’s ‘Iron Wall’.”

44 Caspit, “Where Were Israeli Air Force Fighter Jets on October 7?”; and Bergman and Kingsley, “How Israel’s Feared Security Services Failed to Stop Hamas’s Attack.”

45 Ibid.

46 Caspit, “Exposure: the shelved report of 8200 on the omissions that led to the massacre in the south.”

47 On information technology and intelligence, see Berkowitz, “Information Technology and Intelligence Reform.” On Israel’s intelligence failures, see Kahana, “Analyzing Israel’s Intelligence Failures.”

48 Williams, “Israel’s Shin Bet Spy Service Uses Generative AI to Thwart Threats.”

49 “Lawlessness: A former intelligence official reveals another omission we didn’t know about.”

50 Walman, “Overreliance on technology is a big mistake”: This is how the splendor of Israeli high-tech collapsed against the basic measures of Hamas.”

51 Shoval, “‘The morale in Hamas is low, since the maneuver – they have no successes’: a special interview with the frontline intelligence officer.”

52 Colonel Y, Deputy Commander, 8200, “The digital change in intelligence – a new potential for spaces of integration.”

53 Globerman, “What the world will learn from October 7?”

54 Walman, “Overreliance on technology is a big mistake”: This is how the splendor of Israeli high-tech collapsed against the basic measures of Hamas.”

55 Ben Israel, “Israel and the Palestinians – basic assumptions for updating the concept of security Following ‘Tzuk Eitan,’” 21.

56 Ben Israel, 23; Stancati and Nissenbaum, “Israel Aims to Destroy Hamas. What Comes Next for Gaza Is Unclear.”