Hostage deal shows that victory was never going to be decisive

By Yaakov Katz (The Jerusalem Post. )

The dilemma surrounding the hostage deal with Hamas is one that cannot be understated. On one hand, there is the undeniable, urgent need to bring the hostages home – those still alive and those whose bodies are being cynically held by the murderous terrorist group.

At the very basic level, we need to remember that there are hostages alive in Gaza – estimates suggest at least half of them are – and they can be brought home. This war began with the brutal attack on October 7, during which 251 people were abducted. Their return to their families is the very essence of what victory should look like.

But there is, of course, the other side to the equation: the immense risks Israel faces. The government entered into this deal reluctantly, fully aware of its fundamental flaw: Hamas’s refusal to release all hostages in one go. Instead, the deal is structured in a way that will see 33 Israelis released in several batches over the next 42 days. On day 16, the sides will start negotiations for the second phase of the deal, which is supposed to ensure the return of the remaining hostages.

Can Hamas be trusted to follow through on the second phase? The answer is painfully clear.

Those who oppose the deal are not without reason when they argue that halting the war, even temporarily, could endanger Israel. The logic is straightforward: Hostages will remain in captivity, meaning Hamas retains leverage, and Hamas itself remains. Israel will pause its military operations, pull back from certain areas of Gaza, and Hamas will almost certainly try to rebuild.

This dilemma, though, is not new; it was apparent from the very beginning of this war. The moment Hamas abducted so many people, it became clear that achieving a decisive victory would not be possible.

Had someone promised, for example, early on in the conflict that the war would end with Hamas eliminated but without returning the hostages, some might have accepted that outcome, but many Israelis would have viewed it as a defeat.

On the other hand, if someone had said that it would be possible to bring all of the hostages home but at the cost of allowing Hamas to retain its capabilities and remain in control of Gaza, that too would have been seen by many as a loss.

This is exactly why a hostage deal is needed. It is a concrete, tangible outcome. A deal that saves lives, bringing both civilians and soldiers back to their families and to their nation.

The broader goals of dismantling Hamas’s rule over Gaza and preventing its resurgence are far more elusive. They are objectives that hinge on several unpredictable factors, which could take years to determine if they have been achieved. The hostages, on the other hand, don’t have years – they don’t even have days.

Unfortunately though, in Israel nothing can be discussed without being filtered through the political lens – and the hostage deal is no exception. It has reached the point where it’s possible to predict someone’s stance on the deal based on how they vote.

Worse still, there are those who cannot even consider the deal without first assessing how it aligns with their views of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. If they support him, they support the deal; if they oppose him, they criticize the deal.

When US Secretary of State Antony Blinken declared two weeks ago that Hamas was to blame for the delay in reaching a deal, Netanyahu’s supporters pounced on the comment, spreading it widely to counter the widespread narrative that it was Netanyahu who was stalling for political reasons.

But when Itamar Ben-Gvir claimed on Tuesday that he had personally sabotaged a deal over the past year, suddenly those same voices fell silent. The truth is, Ben-Gvir had only one means of undermining the deal – by wielding political threats.

For Ben-Gvir, in a grotesque way, prolonging the suffering of hostages in Gaza’s terror tunnels while knowing that some would die was somehow a badge of honor. But what he also acknowledged was that Netanyahu caved to his threats. In other words, according to Ben-Gvir, Netanyahu chose to prioritize his coalition’s survival over the prospect of securing a hostage deal.

So, what is the truth? As with most complex issues, the answer lies somewhere in between. Hamas was undoubtedly the intransigent party, repeatedly refusing to engage in meaningful negotiations. However, Netanyahu’s political future was undeniably a factor in his decision-making process. That is the harsh reality.

We must also acknowledge that the Middle East landscape was drastically different just a few months ago, and there is room to argue that a deal then would not have been from a position of power for Israel.

The recent defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the weakening of Iran, and the continuing degradation of Hamas all made a deal far more viable now than it would have been six months ago.

In the end, whether we support or oppose the deal, we must not lose sight of one simple truth: This is the only real way to bring the hostages home. There are people alive in Gaza, people who were abandoned by their country and their military on October 7. We have an obligation to get them back.

Hamas will not simply disappear, and Israel will have to continue its fight against the terrorist group in the future. But for now, we can celebrate the end of a long war and the return of our people. Sometimes, that can be enough.