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Edited by: Fern Sidman
In a covert operation reminiscent of Israel’s legendary intelligence missions, undercover IDF soldiers disguised as beggars and vegetable sellers played a pivotal role in the assassination of Mohammed Deif, Hamas’s most senior military commander, often referred to as the ‘Master of Camouflage,’ as was reported by The Jewish Chronicle of the UK. This operation, which has only now come to light, underscores the lengths to which Israel’s military and intelligence agencies will go to neutralize high-value targets who pose a significant threat to its national security.
Mohammed Deif was not just any Hamas operative; he was the mastermind behind some of the most devastating attacks against Israel, including the October 7 massacre in which 1200 Israelis and others murdered and 251 others taken into captivity in Gaza. Known for his ability to evade capture, Deif had earned a reputation as one of the most elusive figures in Hamas, constantly changing locations and adopting stringent security measures to avoid detection, according to the information provided in The JC report. However, despite his efforts to remain undetected, Israeli intelligence was able to exploit a critical lapse in his security protocol, leading to his eventual demise.
The Israel Defense Force announced earlier today that they now have Confirmation that Mohammed Deif, the Head of Hamas’s Military Wing also known as the Al-Qassam Brigades, was Eliminated by a July 13th Airstrike on a Hamas Compound near the City of Khan Yunis in Southern Gaza. pic.twitter.com/0ScdQCQTOv
— OSINTdefender (@sentdefender) August 2, 2024
The operation that led to Deif’s assassination was as daring as it was meticulously planned. For months, Israeli intelligence had been closely monitoring Deif’s movements, particularly his visits to the al-Mawasi tent complex on the Gazan coast, where he regularly met with fellow Hamas operatives and checked on the conditions of displaced Gazans, as was revealed in the JC report. Unbeknownst to Deif, his pattern of behavior had become predictable, and this predictability would be his downfall.
The key to the operation’s success lay in the ability of the IDF to place undercover agents in strategic locations. According to sources, one agent posed as a market stallholder, selling vegetables outside the apartment building where Deif was known to meet other Hamas leaders. As per the information contained in the JC report, this agent, along with others disguised as beggars in the area, was able to gather crucial intelligence on Deif’s movements, including the exact times and locations of his meetings.
Once Deif’s location was confirmed, the next phase of the operation was set in motion. A missile strike was carefully coordinated to coincide with his presence in the targeted building. The report in the JC explained that the precision of the strike, which also resulted in the death of Deif’s deputy, Rafa Salama, was a testament to the sophisticated intelligence and operational capabilities of the IDF.
A billboard of Hamas leader Mohammed Deif and Ismail Haniyeh with the slogans in Hebrew that read “eliminated” in the Israeli city of Givatayim. pic.twitter.com/fDHgWP2P0J
— Noor Dahri – نور ڈاہری 🇬🇧 (@dahrinoor2) August 3, 2024
While the operation was executed with precision, the exit plan for the undercover agents had to be adjusted at the last minute. The JC reported that unforeseen circumstances on the ground required the team to alter their original escape route, demonstrating the fluid and dynamic nature of such high-stakes missions. The report also indicated that despite the changes, the agents were successfully extracted from Gaza, further highlighting the professionalism and adaptability of Israel’s special forces.
For thirty years, Deif had adhered to stringent security protocols, constantly changing locations and utilizing various disguises to avoid detection. However, the JC report revealed that Israeli intelligence was startled to discover that Deif had recently begun to frequent the same residential building west of Khan Younis, breaking his long-standing habit of extreme caution.
Initially, this deviation from his usual behavior was met with skepticism. Israeli operatives feared that Deif might be employing different disguises during his visits, creating the illusion of vulnerability while continuing to maintain his elusive reputation. To confirm the reliability of the intelligence, the IDF conducted multiple checks and cross-referenced the information through various channels. The report in the JC explained that after thorough verification, it became evident that this was not a ruse but a genuine lapse in Deif’s otherwise impeccable security routine—an unprecedented failure that presented a unique opportunity for the IDF to strike.
Once the intelligence was confirmed, the IDF began detailed planning for the operation. Surveillance missions were conducted using drones and aircraft, which relayed real-time information to Israel’s command and control center. The JC report indicated that the “Dovdevan” unit, an elite IDF undercover team known for its portrayal in the popular TV series Fauda, was deployed to the area. The unit’s operatives assumed various covers to blend in with the local populace, with some posing as UNRWA workers delivering aid, while others took on the roles of Muslim religious figures offering spiritual support to displaced Gazans, as was reported by the JC. These disguises allowed the operatives to move freely within the encampment, gathering vital intelligence on Deif’s movements and confirming the details of his routine.
The success of the operation hinged on the ability of these undercover agents to remain undetected while they trawled through the crowded encampment. Their covers were carefully chosen to allow them to establish physical and verbal contact with the displaced Gazans, ensuring that they could collect as much information as possible without raising suspicion.
Right out of a Fauda episode. How Israeli spies inflitrated Gaza in disguise to help kill the mastermind of October 7. https://t.co/R3QrzT3eic
— Mark Dubowitz (@mdubowitz) August 13, 2024
As the operation progressed, one of the IDF pilots involved in the surveillance detected suspicious movements of armed Hamas operatives to the east of the encampment. This area had been designated as the escape route for the undercover Israeli agents following the assassination. Concerned that the presence of Hamas fighters might jeopardize the safety of the operatives, the operation commander swiftly devised an alternative exit plan. The report in the JC confirmed that instead of heading eastward towards Israel, as initially planned, the commander directed the covert team to move towards the sea, which was only 100 meters away. The new plan was communicated to the undercover operatives via tiny earpieces, ensuring that the message was delivered discreetly and without alerting anyone nearby.
After several tense hours, during which both the command center and the operatives on the ground anxiously awaited confirmation of Deif’s presence, the moment finally arrived. Indicated in the JC report was that Deif was seen entering the building, and the signal was given to proceed with the assassination. The ground forces, maintaining their composure, began to quietly make their way towards the sea. To onlookers, they appeared to be nothing more than ordinary civilians taking a leisurely stroll, a testament to the operatives’ discipline and the effectiveness of their disguises.
With Deif’s location confirmed, the IDF launched a precise missile strike on the building, successfully killing Deif and his deputy, Rafa Salama. Meanwhile, the undercover operatives reached the shore without incident, where they were swiftly picked up by an IDF ship. Most notably, the JC report said that the entire operation was executed without arousing suspicion, a remarkable achievement given the complexity of the mission and the high stakes involved.
The operation that led to Deif’s death was a multi-phased attack involving two planes, each playing a critical role in ensuring the success of the mission. Five minutes after the operation commenced, the first plane launched a direct attack on the target, completely destroying the building where Deif and his deputy, Rafa Salama, were located, as was detailed in the JC report. This initial strike was designed to inflict maximum damage and eliminate any immediate threats.
Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif, Saleh al-Arouri, Ismail Haniyeh and others have the blood of thousands on their hands.
We will never forget the Hamas massacre on October 7. pic.twitter.com/yzH9kZTCj3
— Israel Defense Forces (@IDF) October 24, 2023
Following this, the second plane executed a strategic maneuver by laying a belt of fire with tiny bombs around the building. This tactic was specifically intended to prevent any Hamas operatives from attempting a rescue operation, thereby isolating Deif and Salama within the burning structure, the JC report added. The use of these bombs created a perimeter of destruction, deterring any potential reinforcements and ensuring that the initial strike’s damage could not be mitigated.
The final and most critical stage of the operation involved the deployment of a bunker-penetrating missile. Israeli informants had provided intelligence indicating that the building had an underground floor, a potential escape route for Deif. The JC report confirmed that the sophisticated missile was designed to penetrate not only the building itself but also the ground floor beneath it, ensuring that any attempts by Deif to flee underground would be thwarted. This aspect of the operation was crucial, as it targeted Deif’s instinctual move to escape to a safer, lower level.
Despite the precision of the strike, confirming Deif’s death proved challenging. Intelligence gathered after the incident suggested that Deif had indeed attempted to flee to the underground floor, as anticipated. However, the JC reported that the extent of the building’s destruction meant that it took the IDF two weeks to clear the rubble and definitively confirm his death. This delay was necessary to ensure that Deif’s remains were accurately identified and that the operation’s success could be reported with certainty.
In contrast, the death of Deif’s deputy, Rafa Salama, was confirmed the day after the attack. Salama was killed on the first floor of the building during the initial strike, making his identification more straightforward, the JC report explained. The elimination of both Deif and Salama in the same operation dealt a significant blow to Hamas’s military leadership, weakening the organization’s operational capabilities.
Mohammed Deif’s death marks the end of a long and notorious career within Hamas. As one of the group’s founding members, Deif was instrumental in shaping its military strategies and expanding its capabilities. After his release from Israeli administrative detention in 1990, where he was held for his involvement in terrorist activities, The JC reported that Deif played a key role in forming the Al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing. Under his leadership, the Brigades became known for their tactics of capturing Israeli soldiers, constructing an extensive network of tunnels in Gaza, and developing rocket-launching techniques that have been used in numerous attacks against Israel.
Deif’s ability to survive multiple assassination attempts earned him a near-mythical status within Hamas. Also noted in the JC report was that in 2002, he lost an eye, a leg, and an arm in one such attempt, yet continued to evade capture and remain a central figure in the organization. The most recent attempt on his life before this final operation occurred in 2014, when his wife and son were killed in an airstrike in Gaza’s Sheikh Radwan neighborhood, the JC report added. Despite these close calls, Deif’s death had eluded Israeli forces until now.
Despite Israel’s confirmation of Deif’s death, Hamas has consistently denied it. This denial serves a dual purpose: first, it aims to maintain the morale of Hamas fighters by preserving the illusion that their leader remains alive and capable of leading future operations, as was suggested in the JC report. Second, by casting doubt on the accuracy of Israeli intelligence, Hamas seeks to undermine confidence in Israel’s sources and methods, creating uncertainty and confusion both within its ranks and among the broader public.
However, the evidence of Deif’s death is clear. The operation’s success, confirmed by extensive intelligence and the physical recovery of Deif’s remains, represents a significant victory for Israel in its ongoing conflict with Hamas. The elimination of Deif, a figure synonymous with the group’s most lethal operations, is a testament to Israel’s resolve to bring its enemies to justice, no matter how long it takes.
As the conflict between Israel and Hamas intensifies, a growing number of Gazans are expressing frustration and resentment towards Hamas, the Iranian backed terrorist group that has governed the Gaza Strip since 2007. The JC report observed that despite Hamas’s efforts to project strength and resilience, there are increasing signs that the people of Gaza are questioning the group’s leadership and its handling of the ongoing war. This discontent has been further highlighted by recent intelligence disclosures and statements from prominent Palestinian figures.
Israeli intelligence unit 8200, known for its advanced surveillance capabilities, has intercepted calls between Gazans that reveal a deepening sense of anger and disillusionment with Hamas. The JC report affirmed that in one particularly telling conversation between two Gazan merchants, the frustration is palpable. “They killed Deif! Inshallah, they will kill Sinwar too,” one merchant says, referring to the recent assassination of Mohammed Deif, Hamas’s top military commander. His friend responds with equal fervor, “Inshallah. I wish.”
This exchange reflects a sentiment that is becoming increasingly common in Gaza: a desire for change and a sense of betrayal by Hamas. For many Gazans, the death of Deif, who was seen as a symbol of Hamas’s military might, is not just a blow to the organization but a moment of reckoning for its leadership, according to the information in the JC report. The mention of Yahya Sinwar, another senior Hamas leader, as a potential target of similar ire shines a spotlight on the depth of this resentment.
The dissatisfaction with Hamas is not limited to private conversations among Gazans. Public figures from rival Palestinian factions are also voicing their criticism. Noted in the JC report was that Munir Jaroub, a senior official from Fatah, Hamas’s main political rival, has openly condemned Hamas for its conduct during the conflict. “Hamas does not care about Gazans and instead employs them as a human shield, which is why there have been so many casualties among Gaza Strip residents,” Jaroub stated, according to the JC report.
This accusation touches on a controversial and sensitive issue: the use of civilians as human shields. Human rights organizations and international observers have long criticized Hamas for embedding its military infrastructure within civilian areas, thereby exposing non-combatants to the dangers of war. The JC report observed that the high civilian casualty rate in Gaza has fueled anger and despair among residents, many of whom feel that they are being sacrificed for Hamas’s military objectives.
The mounting casualties in Gaza, which include women, children, and the elderly, have intensified the criticism of Hamas’s tactics. While the group portrays itself as the defender of Palestinian rights and resistance against Israeli occupation, the reality on the ground tells a different story, the JC report concluded. For many Gazans, the ongoing conflict has brought only suffering, destruction, and loss.
The anger expressed in intercepted calls and public statements is a reflection of the growing awareness among Gazans that Hamas’s approach may be causing more harm than good. The relentless airstrikes, the destruction of homes and infrastructure, and the lack of access to basic necessities have left many questioning the leadership’s decisions, according to the JC report. The death of high-ranking Hamas officials, while celebrated by some, also highlights the vulnerability of the group’s command structure and raises questions about its ability to protect its people.
As the war drags on, the voices of dissent within Gaza are becoming louder and more pronounced. The resentment towards Hamas, fueled by the heavy toll of the conflict and the perception that the group is prioritizing its survival over the welfare of Gazans, could signal a significant shift in public opinion. While it is too early to predict the long-term implications of this discontent, it is clear that Hamas’s grip on Gaza is being tested in ways that it has not been before.
