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By: Zalman Shoval
The principle of self-reliance is fundamental to Israel’s national security concept. Recently, doubts—sometimes tendentious—have been raised about this principle. In the opinion of the late U.S. ambassador to Israel Martin Indyck, for instance, the deployment of American aircraft carriers to the Mediterranean and Red Sea shows that “Israel is not capable of defending itself alone.”
This is a hasty conclusion, because the carriers serve as second-line defense. There is no contradiction between the basic Israeli principle stated above and Israel’s comprehensive cooperation with the United States, which has political, economic and other benefits for both sides. American military aid constitutes 16% of the Israeli defense budget and about 2% of the general budget. It also entails Israeli access to the American security system, with its wide dimensions and possibilities.
Even if Israel were to significantly increase its own production of weapons, as it is obliged to do because of the constant threat of attack, it will continue to need supplies from foreign sources, mainly the United States.
Israel does not have a blank check for this purpose, even though U.S. military aid is anchored by congressional decisions and serves the strategic, industrial and economic interests of the United States. The aid is vulnerable to political considerations in the form of reassessments or internal American political dynamics, such as the anti-Israel trend that is increasingly visible in some parts of the Democratic Party. Problems may also arise from the Republican side of the aisle due to the isolationist positions of Donald Trump.
Countries act according to their interests, and American interests sometimes conflict with Israeli interests. U.S. security ties with Israel met American opposition in the past because of the need for Arab oil, but also because of the fear that America would end up having to fight for the Jewish state.
Those fears evaporated after the Israeli victory in the Six-Day War, which opened the door to an ever-expanding military cooperation with the United States. Since then, total U.S. aid to Israel has increased to $3 billion a year—originally $1.8 billion in military aid and $1.2 billion in civilian aid, to be delivered partly in credit.
An important change was made by Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996 when he announced that Israel would give up civilian aid and that the entire amount would be directed to security. Civilian foreign aid was unpopular in the eyes of American politicians, who had difficulty justifying it at a time when their own constituents were struggling with economic problems. As the Israeli economy was growing at the time, it was unnecessary in any case—certainly in comparison to security aid, which was seen by both the Americans and the Israelis as necessary and justified.
It was agreed that the security aid would be a grant, not a loan, and that the full amount would be granted in advance. There has also been an American contractual commitment in place since 2008 that Israel will have military (i.e. weapons) superiority over its enemies.
From time to time, the idea of a defense agreement between Israel and the United States has been floated, but its critics see it, rightly, as a possible violation of Israel’s freedom of military action without adding much to the existing security arrangements. However, this does not disqualify regional or more extensive military engagements.
Calling Israel “America’s continental aircraft carrier” is an exaggeration, but the facts that Israel is the only democratic and stable country in the Middle East and that it has a developed technological, scientific and military capacity have increased its value to the Americans in a security sense. The operational capability of the Israel Defense Forces in the current war will further strengthen this assessment.
The Israeli concept of security, designed by David Ben-Gurion, is based on several components—deterrence, defense, early warning and decisiveness—and the transfer of war to the enemy’s territory.
On Oct. 7, and in fact well before it, Israeli deterrence faltered. This was the result, in part, of Israel’s refusal to act strongly against the terrorist attacks of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and its reliance instead on the economic benefits of a more tolerant approach.
“Defense” means the country’s borders will be protected by physical elements, such as civilian settlements and various obstacles, but mainly by the IDF. The “18 points” document drawn up by Ben-Gurion in 1953 strove to bridge Israel’s quantitative disparity in terms of population size and military might by prioritizing deterrence and deterrence actions. This approach derived from the insight that Israel cannot sustain long wars and therefore must strive for decisive victory as quickly and overwhelmingly as possible. Despite the emphasis on the principles of defense, Israel should not shy away from proactive actions that serve its basic goals.
The premise is that Israel cannot lose any war, as such a failure—indeed even the image of such a failure—could lead to its destruction. Additional principles such as defensible borders were added to the theory of security.
And as for peace? As Ben-Gurion put it, “Peace is not a goal, and war is not a goal. The goal is the realization of Zionism [and peace will come] when the Arabs also want peace.”
The perceptions formulated by Ben-Gurion did not pass the test of Oct. 7—not because they were incorrect, but because the leadership and the army did not follow them. The settlements surrounding Gaza not only did not constitute an obstacle to aggression but had become an easy target for the attackers, who bypassed the physical obstacles with incredible ease. (This, by the way, was the lesson that should have been learned from the failure of the Bar-Lev line in the Yom Kippur War.) As for the army’s forces, they did exist, but were in the wrong place and lacked the necessary readiness. The “warning”—that is, reliable and constant monitoring of the enemy’s capabilities and provision of a strategic and tactical warning in real time about any movement—was probably the main failure of Oct. 7.
The “decisiveness” value is more complex. In Israel’s circumstances, a temporary decisive win on the battlefield—as was achieved in the War of Independence, the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War—does not prevent the enemy from renewing itself and intensifying further attempts at aggression. Nor can it bring about sustainable peace unless political and international conditions are also met. Israel does enjoy a clear military advantage over its enemies in terms of the quality of its weapon systems, the size of its forces, its technology and its resources—but as the events of Oct. 7 and the current situation with Hezbollah in Lebanon show, these advantages are not always expressed in absolute achievements on the battlefield, at least not in the immediate term.
In recent years, Israel’s security center of gravity has shifted from the Arab world to Iran—initially toward its proxies, but in an inevitable process toward Iran itself, as proved by Iran’s massive air attack on Israel in April. Israel’s military and political cooperation with the United States played an important role in thwarting Iranian intentions on that day.
(JNS.org)
Originally published by the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
