By: A7 Staff
Shabak investigation into case of man who attempted to spy for Iran who worked in home of Minister Gantz submits results.
The investigation committee appointed by Shabak chief Ronen Bar to investigate the employment of a suspected Iranian spy in the Defense Minister Benny Gantz’s home has submitted its conclusions.
In recent weeks, the Shabak has conducted many investigations that have dealt with the specific failure which led to the man being allowed to be employed in the defense minister’s home as well as broader processes in the field of personal security.
The committee included three retired senior Shabak officials–two former division heads and a former division head in the field of security and security coordination.
The findings of the investigation and the operative lessons were presented to Bar, who issued a series of instructions accordingly.
The Shabak stated that “professional failures were discovered in Omri Goren’s security diagnostic process, due to professional gaps and omissions in the work processes. In addition, deficiencies were discovered in the control processes that were supposed to detect the mistake after the fact.”
In addition, there was a “gap in the work process that regularly synchronizes all the factors involved in the security of the Minister and his environment–the diagnostic unit and the security unit in the Shabak and those in charge of security on behalf of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Defense Ministry.”
As part of the immediate learning of lessons and under the guidance of the Shabak chief, an extensive examination was performed on the staff of all secured persons–in practice, the inspection and diagnosis procedures of the people close to the secured persons were tightened. In addition, the interfaces and areas of responsibility between the personal security unit and the clerks in government ministries responsible for personal homes have been sharpened and refreshed.
The Shin Bet chief also issued instructions on the addition of intelligence and operational protection layers in the security shell of the persons secured by the organization. Work processes were also changed and control factors were added to the security diagnostic process of professionals and others in the personal environment.
Despite with the failure to prevent Omri Goren from being employed by the minister, the head of the service praised the professional and rapid counterterrorism operation that made it possible to immediately locate and arrest the suspect within 48 hours of his contacting Iranian agents.
The findings of the investigation and the conclusions of the external examination committee, defined the incident as a professional error. The Shabak chief noted his appreciation for the way in which responsibility was taken and the rapid application of the lessons learned for improvement of future operations.
Shabak chief Ronen Bar said after receiving the results: “Despite the success in thwarting [the spy after he made contact with Iranian agents], we failed to prevent it. In a proper process such a person was not supposed to work in the environment of a secured individual. The incident that occurred here has allowed us an in-depth examination that will lead to improved processes and control mechanisms with regard to the issue of officials in the environment of secured individuals.”
(INN)
